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Abstract
Since the breakup of the colonial empires following World War II, many newly
independent states have embarked on a path of seeking political and economic
development. Scholars studying this phenomenon soon became aware of an interesting
puzzle. Why do the economies that have substantial natural resource endowments at their
disposal tend to develop at a slower rate than economies that are less endowed with
natural resources? From this question, the resource curse theory was derived. The
resource curse theory has three main claims. The first claim is that resource rich
economies grow at a slower rate than non-resource rich economies. The second claim is
that resource rich states are more prone to conflict. 1 The last claim, that resource rich
states are more prone to corruption, will be addressed by this study. Using data on
resource rents and resource exports, this study utilizes statistical modeling to test the
relationship between natural resource endowments and corruption. This study finds that
only fuel related natural resources have a statistically significant and negative
relationship with perceptions of corruption due to asset specificity and relative scarcity.

1

The first two claims have been well studied in the literature and are not the focus of this thesis.

iii

Acknowledgements
I owe my deepest thanks to the faculty at the Political Science Department that I
have been able to get to know during my seven long years as an undergraduate and a
graduate student at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I am also indebted to my fellow
Graduate Assistants in the Political Science Department. My time at this university has
been fraught with difficult times in my personal life. Without the support of my friends,
my colleagues, and my faculty, I do not think I would have been able to complete this
long journey. First, I would like to thank Dr. John Tuman for all of the encouragement
and support he has given me. I would also like to thank the other members of my thesis
committee: Dr. Jonathan Strand, Dr. Tiffiany Howard, and Dr. Bernard Malamud.
I owe my deepest thanks to several Graduate Assistants in the Political Science
Department. I owe my gratitude to Eugene O’Neal and Jason Mitchell. The two of you
were like brothers to me. I will never forget the times we spent planning and scheming. I
also owe my gratitude to Doc Bradley. You gave me a great deal of advice and helped me
keep myself together through a very difficult time. Lastly I owe my gratitude to Kate
Eugenis. You always had a cheery disposition, which helped to lift my spirits when I was
down.
Finally, I would like to thank my friends and my family. You mean the world to
me and I would not be at this point if it were not for you.

iv

Table of Contents
Abstract

iii

Acknowledgements

iv

List of Tables

vi

Chapter One: Introduction

1

Chapter Two: Definitions and Typologies of Corruption

8

Chapter Three: Theoretical Perspectives and Determinants of Corruption

17

Chapter Four: The Resource Curse Theory and Corruption

30

Chapter Five: Methodology and Data

45

Chapter Six: Results and Analysis

60

Chapter Seven: Policy Implications and Conclusions

88

Appendix

94

References

102

Author’s Curriculum Vitae

110

v

List of Tables
Table 1: Total Rents Model

61

Table 2: Coal Rents Model

64

Table 3: Forest Rents Model

66

Table 4: Mineral Rents Model

68

Table 5: Natural Gas Rents Model

70

Table 6: Oil Rents Model

72

Table 7: Fuel Exports Model

74

Table 8: Ore and Metals Exports Model

75

Table 9: Statistical Significance Counter

77

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

94

vi

Chapter One
Introduction
Why has corruption become a topic of interest for scholars? Over the last thirty
years, numerous agencies and many scholars have begun to take the topic of corruption
seriously. As a result of these efforts, numerous ratings agencies have created systems of
measuring and comparing corruption across countries and over time. This has, in turn,
allowed for the quantitative analysis of the determinants and effects of corruption. To
begin, it is necessary to answer the following question. What is the effect of corruption on
a state or an economy?

The Effects of Corruption on the State
Two competing theories have emerged describing the effect of corruption on a
state or on an economy. The first theory states that corruption actually has a positive
effect on a given state or economy. It arises as the result of government policy failures
and utilizes market mechanisms to correct them. The other theory is that corruption
harms a given state or society. What follows is an examination of both perspectives on
corruption.
According to some scholars, corruption may be beneficial to society. If this is the
case, is it worth paying close attention to? Many scholars have identified possible
benefits of corruption. Leff (1964) makes the classic argument about the possible benefits
of corruption. For Leff, corruption provides information about the effective political
system whereas laws only provide information about the formal political system.
Therefore, corruption is in effect the actual practice of government. Specifically,
1

corruption provides the means to avoid a bureaucracy that may be indifferent or hostile to
the economy or to development. Corruption can also fill the void that may exist in a
government bureaucracy that has other priorities. Leff also believes that corruption
reduces uncertainty between investors and bureaucrats. This, in turn, is likely to increase
the opportunities for investment. Corruption can also provide an avenue for innovation
according to Leff. Entrepreneurs may, through graft, gain access to policy makers and
bureaucrats and introduce innovation into the market before becoming established
politically. Lastly, Leff views corruption as a hedge against bad government policy.
Actors can engage in corruption to avoid them all together (8-11).
Bayley (1966) echoes many of the claims of Leff and gives other scenarios in
which corruption can be beneficial to a society. First, the opportunity to extract rents in a
bureaucracy could serve to attract higher quality candidates to the bureaucracy. The rents
can be treated as a portion of the wages earned. Therefore, a higher wage level should
attract better candidates, ceteris paribus. The rents extracted from these corrupt
exchanges, if they end up in banks, could serve to divert money from consumption to
investment. The Marcos regime in the Philippines stole millions of dollars, which ended
up in bank accounts in the West. These funds were then invested by the banks, possibly
creating economic growth elsewehere. Corruption and nepotism may also serve as a
substitute for a public works system and provide a means of giving the left-out a stake in
the political system. In the context of states undergoing modernization, corruption may
serve to reduce the hardships of transitioning from traditional to Western norms (727730). Klitgaard (1988) points out that corruption may help to introduce market forces in

2

the distribution of state goods, it may also foster political integration through payments,
appointments, and policy formation, and finally, it can help organizations avoid
constraining bureaucratic rules (31-33). Theobald (1990) echoes some of these supposed
benefits of corruption. In terms of economic development, corruption may enhance
capital formation, entrepreneurialism, reduction of red tape, and the introduction of
market forces into the state sector. In terms of political development, corruption may help
in the development of political parties, participation, and national integration (116-125).
How have these claims stood up to empirical testing? There is a large and
substantial body of empirical work that demonstrates the negative consequences of
corruption. In terms of economic development, the negative consequences of corruption
cannot be ignored. One consistent finding in the literature is that corruption reduces
investment (Mauro, 1995; Gray and Kaufman, 1998; Wei, 2000; Habib and Zurawicki,
2002). Firms, ceteris paribus, will prefer to invest in climates with the lowest risk and the
highest return. The frequency and number of bribes paid become a cost to doing business
and discourage investment. Corruption has also been found to decrease spending on
education and health care (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Mauro, 1998; Gupta et. al., 2002).
Opportunities to engage in graft are not as great in education spending or health care
spending, so funds tend to be diverted elsewhere. This has a negative effect on the ability
of a state to develop human capital, which has adverse effects on development. Studies
have also shown that states with higher rates of corruption tend to spend more on large
public works projects as corruption creates the opportunity to profit substantially (Tanzi
and Davoodi, 1997; Mauro, 1998).
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Not surprisingly, corruption has also been linked to political instability (Mo,
2001). Unstable political systems are generally unable to provide suitable climates for
economic development. Similarly, corruption also undermines authority and distorts the
ability of the state to collect revenues (Gary and Kaufman, 1998; Tanzi, 1998; Gupta et.
al., 2002). This may lead to a situation where fewer firms are being taxed at a higher rate
than would be if corruption were eliminated. Finally, corruption has been shown to have
serious distributional consequences for citizens living in a corrupt state (Gupta, et. al.,
2002).
Taken as a whole, all of these findings show many characteristics of corrupt states
that can reduce economic growth. Quantitative scholarship has shown this to be true as
well (Nas, 1986; Mauro, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Mo, 2001; Gupta et. al., 2002).
Unfortunately, corruption tends to spread throughout an economy rather than remain
confined by a sector (Jain, 2002). Therefore, claims that corruption can be beneficial are
highly questionable. More importantly, the manifestation of corruption in any portion of
the state should be treated seriously by scholars due to the tendency for corruption to
spread.
Clearly, corruption is harmful to states and economies in which it has taken hold.
Due to this, corruption is indeed a worthy topic of study for scholars. In an
interdependent world, the negative effects of corruption are not likely to be contained in
one economy, and spillover may occur. Therefore examining the causes, consequences,
and remedies for corruption has both practical and scholarly value.

4

The Resource Curse Theory
Many different empirical studies have been conducted on the causes, the
consequences, and remedies for corruption. Many of these studies will be reviewed in
later chapters of this study. Of central interest to this paper, however, is the relationship
between natural resource endowments and corruption. The developing world contains
many states that have rich resource endowments. These endowments have long been
viewed as a key asset to help many developing states, which typically have lower levels
of human development, achieve a higher standard of living. After all, is it not better to
have rich resource endowments than to have none? Yet, a strange phenomenon has been
observed since the end of the Second World War. The developing states with abundant
natural resources suffered from a myriad of problems that severely hindered their
political and economic development. Numerous studies have demonstrated relationships
among natural resource endowments, corruption, internal conflict, and low levels of
economic growth. States which suffer from one of these outcomes face impediments to
development. In this manner, they are cursed by their resource wealth. This is known as
the paradox of plenty or the “resource curse theory.”
Providing insights into the problems of the developing world is an important
endeavor for political scientists and economists alike. The world system is, after all,
interdependent. Due to this phenomenon, the problems of one state rarely stay within that
state. States that are prone to corruption are more likely to be a cause for concern in the
global system. The Democratic Republic of the Congo provides an excellent example.
Rife with corruption, the DRC cannot develop necessary institutions to adequately
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govern. The needs of its citizens are routinely not met by the state, providing an
atmosphere of discontent that fuels various separatist militias. Unfortunately, the
Congolese are not the only people harmed by this conflict as it has spilled over into many
of the neighboring states. If natural resource endowments are a determinant of these
outcomes, then it represents an important topic of study.
To this end, this study will examine the relationships between natural resource
abundance and corruption. In contrast to other studies on this topic, this research makes
use of disaggregated resource rent measures. Therefore, this study can add more precision
to the resource curse theory. Namely, what types of natural resources are associated with
higher degrees of perceived corruption? Answering this question will provide important
insights to economists and policy makers engaged in natural resource governance. If
certain types of industries are prone to corruption, policy makers and development
professionals can devise strategies to mitigate some of the negative consequences. It can
also empower citizens of states with rich resource endowments to carefully scrutinize
relationships between identified resource sectors and the state.

Conclusion
Corruption is an important topic for study by political scientists and economists. A
cursory examination of the literature clearly demonstrates the negative effects corruption
has on developing states. Moving forward, this research intends to lay-out the linkages
between natural resource endowments and corruption. To begin, it is necessary to review
the existing literature on corruption. Chapter Two will examine definitions and typologies
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of corruption that have been identified in the literature. Chapter Three is devoted to
examining different theoretical perspectives on corruption and empirical research on the
determinants of corruption. Chapter Four discusses the resource curse theory and how it
relates to corruption. Chapter Five covers data collection and methodological issues
relating to the statistical models this study will employ to test hypotheses. Chapter Six
contains the outputs of the models used in this study along with an analysis of the results.
Finally, Chapter Seven contains the conclusions of this study

7

Chapter Two
Definitions and Typologies of Corruption
Corruption is a problem that occurs in all polities. Corruption may undermine
effective governance and lead to deadweight loss in the economy. There is an extensive
body of work related to the causes and effects of corruption. Many of these works are
broad based and are not specific to particular industries or countries. Before beginning, it
is essential to first provide a definition of corruption. Specifying a definition makes it
possible to determine what to analyze and what to ignore. After reviewing different
definitions of corruption, this chapter will then cover existing typologies of corruption.
Combined, a review of definitions and typologies of corruption will allow for a careful
examination of the different theoretical perspectives on corruption.

Definitions of Corruption
A review of the literature shows that defining corruption has proven difficult.
Cockcroft (2012:3) observes that definitions of corruption range from “the decay of
society to the single act of bribery.” Containing such a wide range of behaviors and
activities makes it difficult to reach a consensus. Yet an outline has emerged in much of
the scholarship on corruption that can be utilized as a baseline definition. Shleifer and
Vishny (1998) offer a simple definition of corruption as the “sale by government officials
of government property for personal gain” (91). This definition, while concise, has
limitations. First, what is classified as government property? Does the provision of
services and the granting of access count under this definition? This definition is also
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silent on whether or not the act violates the law or the common good.
The above definition is very similar to the definition of corruption used by the
World Bank, which is the “abuse of public office for unauthorized private gain” (World
Bank, 2000). By using the term abuse instead of sale, this definition covers a broader
category of behavior. This definition also incorporates the term unauthorized, which
allows researchers to compare the act with the legal code. Jain (2002:73) provides a
definition that is nearly identical. For Jain, corruption “is an act in which the power of
public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the
game.” Is there a difference between unauthorized behavior and behavior that
contravenes the rules of the game? “Unauthorized behavior” implies strict legal sanction
whereas “contravenes the rules” of the game can be interpreted to include informal norms
inherent to any institution. In these definitions, only government officials are guilty of
corruption. Private actors, which can also be a beneficiary of a corrupt act, are absolved
of responsibility. This is a serious shortcoming of defining corruption in that manner as
private actors may initiate a corrupt exchange with a public employee. Furthermore, it is
not clear what classifies as abuse or circumvention. Does this have to do with actually
circumventing the law or acting in a manner inconsistent with the common good?
While there are shortcomings to the above definitions, they form the traditional
baseline definition of corruption. Yadav (2011) offers three amendments to the above
definition to increase its validity. First, the public or political entities do not have to
actually occupy an office. They may promise to abuse office upon being appointed or
elected in exchange for support. Second, the gains from engaging in corruption can be
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indirect. For example, gains from corruption may go to a collective group, such as a
political party or an interest group as a whole rather than an individual member. Finally,
the law does not have to specifically be violated for an act to be considered corrupt.
Legislators may legally enact legislation that favors a group that offered prior
compensation (5-6).
della Porta and Vannucci (1999) offer a more concise version of the definition
above. To them, corruption is a situation in which “there is a secret violation of a contract
that, implicitly or explicitly, specifies a delegation of responsibility and the exercise of
some discretionary power in an agent who, against the interests or preferences of the
principal, acts in favor of a [corruptor], from which he receives a reward” (17). Two
important aspects of corruption are implicitly identified in this definition. The first is that
economic elites may try to leverage their wealth to seek public power and influence over
policy. This is referred to as state capture. The other aspect is that political elites may
leverage their positions to gain wealth. This is referred to as state predation (Spector,
2012:5-6). This definition identifies actors in specific positions and utilizes the common
good as a reference point. Referencing the common good is troubling, however. This
requires investigators to identify the common good prior to identifying corrupt acts, but it
is doubtful that a consensus could ever be reached on such a topic.
Rogow and Lasswell (1978) offer a definition of corruption to address these
particular situations. These authors define a corrupt act as an act that “violates
responsibility toward at least one system of public or civic order and is in fact
incompatible with and destructive of any such system” (54-55). A question emerges from
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this definition for corruption. What kinds of acts are incompatible with and destructive of
public or civic order? Can an act betray a system of public order but not be incompatible
with it or destructive to it? Consider an act that circumvents an existing law that is
harmful to the public good. Would this be considered corrupt? Like the definition given
by della Porta and Vannucci, basing a definition off of an ideal common good presents
challenges.
Certainly there are many other definitions of corruption that exist in the literature.
The survey of definitions above, however, is enough to raise important questions. First,
does an act have to be in violation of legal statutes to be considered corrupt? Second,
does the act have to be in exchange for some type of benefit? Third, does the act have to
be contrary to the public good? Different opinions on these three questions can produce
varying definitions that would disagree on many types of exchanges.

Typologies of Corruption
While there seems to be a general outline of corrupt behavior, the above
definitions are not enough to effectively categorize corrupt acts. As Vogl states,
“Corruption is not a single event, but a continuum” (2012:12). Therefore, typologies are
needed to classify corruption in terms of degree. A number of scholars have offered
different typologies to capture the various forms of corruption. This section reviews and
synthesizes the literature.
The first typology to be covered was introduced by Theobald (1990). He chose to
classify corrupt acts based upon the principles they betrayed: public office, public

11

interest, and public opinion. The public office typology is based upon Max Weber’s ideal
type of rational-legal bureaucracy (2). At the core of this ideal typology is the assumption
that bureaucrats are expected to be impartial, to be impersonal, and to accept the strict
separation between the incumbent and the office. Deviations from this model are
generally seen as being corrupt. This typology tends to view corruption as an individual
act rather than a system of behavior. It is also the easiest to classify, as any bureaucracy
should have a codified system of rules that determine what is legal and what is not. The
public interest typology of corruption includes any act that can be said to betray the
common good (5-6). Classifying corruption in this manner can present challenges. First,
scholars must have a clear idea of what type of behavior is in the public good. Second,
certain behaviors may be in the common interest but against the law and, on the other
hand, certain lawful acts may be against the common interest.
The last typology of corruption identified by Theobald is called the public opinion
conception. This type of corruption classifies an act as corrupt if public opinion in a given
society would judge it to be corrupt. Three types of the public opinion conception of
corruption exist: black corruption, gray corruption, and white corruption. The differences
between the three types depend on how they are perceived by elites and how they are
perceived by the masses. Black corruption is corruption that elites and the masses
condemn. Gray corruption is corruption that one group condemns, usually elites, and one
group is ambiguous about. Finally, white corruption is an act of corruption that is seen as
unworthy of punishment by the majority (6). Like the public interest conception, the
public opinion conception could be difficult to apply. Survey data could provide evidence
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into public opinion at a given time, but it would take time to carry out such a survey for
each action. It may also be difficult to judge who qualifies as an elite and who does not.
Alam (1989) introduces a typology based upon the ways in which government
officials distort legally prescribed interactions between an actor’s claim to benefits and
costs an actor must bear. Stated differently, officials can seek to deny rights or absolve
obligations for some form of compensation. From this framework, four types of
corruption are identified by Alam. The first is cost-reducing corruption. This type of
corruption is best represented by situations where a government official grants tax
reductions or is lax in the enforcement of regulations. The second type of corruption is
cost-enhancing corruption. This type of corruption occurs when an official has control
over the provision or administration of a good or service and charges a cost for their use.
An example of this type of corruption is when an official will only issue a license for a
bribe. The next two types of corruption relate to the distribution of benefits. First is
benefit-reducing corruption. This type of corruption occurs whenever an official transfers
excess benefits to an actor. This could include over reporting work done to pay out more
monetary rewards. This is common in nepotism and patronage. The second type is
benefit-reducing corruption. Benefit-reducing corruption includes acts in which a
government official appropriates goods that were intended for an actor. For example, the
theft of medical supplies would count as benefit-reducing corruption (442-443). This
typology is limited however in that it only recognizes the corruption of state functions. It
does not recognize private sector corruption. Furthermore, it uses the law and policies as
its baseline for judging an act to be corrupt or not. Many types of lobbying would not be

13

covered by this typology.
Aidt (2003) created a typology of corruption based upon two different factors. The
first factor is the degree of benevolence of an official tasked with implementing a policy
or designing an institution. The second factor is whether the determinant of the level of
corruption is institutional or historical. From these factors, Aidt identifies four different
categories of corruption. The first is efficient corruption. Efficient corruption facilitates
beneficial interactions between different actors that could not be possible otherwise.
Theoretically, efficient corruption promotes efficiency in the allocation of goods that may
arise from pre-existing state failures. Next is corruption with a benevolent principal. This
type of corruption occurs when a benevolent actor grants discretionary power to a nonbenevolent actor. The degree of corruption in this type depends upon whether the
institution was designed optimally. Corruption with a non-benevolent principal is the next
category of corruption. This occurs when a non-benevolent actor introduces inefficient
policies in order to extract rents. The degree of corruption in this type depends on the
incentive structures that exist within existing institutions. Lastly, Aidt identifies selfreinforcing corruption. This type of corruption depends on the levels of corruption in the
past and depends on history (F633). This typology has the most use when diagnosing
strategies for addressing corruption. Solutions are implicit in the definitions of the first
three types. The fourth type of corruption in this typology, however, does not have an
easy solution.
Other scholars have offered typologies based upon the frequency, the duration,
and the amount of resources at stake. Using those dimensions, della Porta and Vannucci
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(2012) identify four types of corruption. The first is petty corruption. Petty corruption
occurs at a low frequency or a short duration and involves a small amount of resources.
An example of this could be an officer taking a bribe for a ticket. Individual corruption
occurs at a short frequency or a low duration but involves a large amount of resources.
This could be a high level bureaucrat granting a license for resource extraction for a large
sum of money. Structural corruption occurs at a high frequency or a long duration and
involves a small amount of resources. An example of this type of corruption could be an
entire bureaucracy that charges a small fee for service delivery. Lastly, systemic
corruption occurs at a high frequency or a long duration and involves a large amount of
resources. This type of corruption could be represented by a political regime that
systematically utilizes political appointments to accrue vast amount of wealth (37-39).
There is still a bit of ambiguity in this typology. Measuring differences in frequency,
duration, and the amount of resources at stake involves a degree of subjectivity and
relativism. If baselines could be established, however, this problem could be solved at the
state level. Whether this typology would be useful for cross-national studies is difficult to
say.
For the purposes of this study, it is useful to make use of the traditional definition
of corruption utilized by the World Bank. Many of the cross national surveys created to
make comparisons of corruption use this definition which will allow this study to
generalize with the surveys. This study also incorporates Theobald’s typology of
corruption, specifically the public office conception. Like the World Bank definition, this
typology is common in much of the empirical work that has been done and will allow this
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study to contribute to that wide body of literature.

Conclusion
Defining and categorizing corruption has proven to be a challenge for scholars
studying this phenomenon. When the definition of corruption is written narrowly, it can
aid in the examination of a specific type, but it loses the ability to view corruption
systemically. When the definition of corruption is written too broadly, however, scholars
can become overwhelmed by the many different types of corruption. It seems like it
would be helpful to try to define corruption based upon the environments with which it
occurs. For example, bureaucratic corruption will differ from private sector corruption.
By doing this, scholars may be able to build theories within these domains and perhaps
make linkages between the two.
The typologies covered in this chapter all offer important insights into looking at
corruption. To create a typology, however, one must identify a baseline to judge an act as
corrupt. All of the above typologies could be utilized to fully examine different corrupt
acts. The benefit of doing so is that the typologies contain insights into the motivations
behind and the consequences of a corrupt act. This can give scholars and policy makers
insights on how to prevent bureaucrats and politicians from engaging in corruption.
To summarize, all of the definitions of and the typologies of corruption have
utility. Scholars must think clearly and carefully about what specific types of corruption
they wish to study and select the definition and typology that will provide the most
leverage to their research program.
16

Chapter Three
Theoretical Perspectives and Determinants of Corruption
Definitions and typologies are useful for identifying and classifying corruption.
They do not, however, answer a fundamental question about corruption. Namely, why
does corruption occur? Scholars have given different explanations for why an actor may
engage in corruption. Broadly, they fall into three categories: 1) political-economic or
rational choice, 2) sociocultural, and 3) neo-institutional. Following an analysis of the
theoretical paradigms, the empirical record will be engaged to identify the determinants
of corruption. 2

Theoretical Perspectives on Corruption
The political-economic model of corruption was first identified by RoseAckerman (1978) who provides a starting point from which most scholarship on the
topic. As a rational-choice model, Rose-Ackerman’s model focuses primarily on
structural incentives and agency relationships (5-6). Three types of actors are specified in
this model. First is the superior. Superiors have a set of preferences which relate to
desired outcomes. Second, there are agents are directed by superiors to achieve these
outcomes. Lastly, there are third parties that seek to influence an agent’s decision.
Monitoring can be costly to the superior. The larger a bureaucracy is, the higher the costs
to monitor it. Therefore, agents obtain a degree of freedom from the preferences and
outcomes desired by the superior. The more freedom there is, the greater the potential

2

The theories on the resource curse and corruption, which are central to this study, are covered in Chapter
Four.
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supply of corruption. The demand for corruption comes from the third party. For the third
party, corrupting an existing law is likely more cost effective than obtaining power to
impose a new set of rules (6-9). Della Porta and Vannucci (1999) utilize a similar model
of corruption that involves similar categories of actors. Instead of superiors, agents, and
third parties, della Porta and Vannucci use a model that includes principals, agents, and
corruptors respectively (16-17).
This model is exclusively a micro-level theory. On the supply side, corruption can
be treated as an additional transaction cost imposed upon producers. In a basic supply and
demand curve, the cost of the bribe or rent causes the price of a good to increase. This
will negatively impact the demand function for a good, causing less to be produced at a
higher cost to society (Shleifer, 1998:94). On the demand side, firms wish to avoid
competition and will behave in a manner similar to a monopoly. They can be expected to
pass on inefficiency to consumers by either producing less or charging more or both.
Again, dead weight loss will occur with respect to the overall welfare of society
(Lambsdorff, 2007:115). Implicit in this model of corruption is that human beings are
rational, utility maximizing actors. If the probability of being caught and the punishment
associated with being caught is less than the payoff of engaging in a corrupt act, one
should expect the agent to engage in corruption.
Under what conditions is corruption most likely to occur in the political-economic
theoretical perspective? Corruption thrives in situations involving asymmetries in
information, bargaining power, and enforcement. When information is precious and
difficult to obtain, corruption is likely to occur. If there is a high opportunity cost to
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bargaining, then corruption is likely to occur. Lastly when monitoring and enforcing the
law is costly or risky, corruption is likely to occur (della Porta and Vannucci, 2012:2027). There are specific contexts in which corruption has been shown to flourish as well.
Another situation that lends itself to corruption is a situation in which there is
competition between state officials and consumers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). One such
example is a transition economy that has a mixture of controlled prices and market prices.
The systems can create a dynamic where the rewards of entrepreneurship and investment
decline against the returns to rent-seeking (Bardhan, 1997). Specific institutional
situations can create incentives to engage in corruption as well. The way the state
operates; the role of the state in licensing, permitting, authorizations, and granting
monopoly power; and the structure of tax collection can all have a dramatic impact on the
development of corruption (Tanzi, 1998:563-567). Tangentially related to institutional
characteristics, civil servant pay has been shown to be correlated with perceptions of
corruption. When the average pay of a civil service worker is low, perceptions of
corruption should be high (Van Rijckeghem et. al, 2001).
The availability of rents seems to have a great deal of explanatory power in this
regard. Rents become available under circumstances in which government intervention
can lead to the presence of excessive profits. Types of government behavior that cause
rents include: tariffs, import quotas, subsidies, tax deductions, price controls, multiple
exchange rate practices, multiple foreign exchange allocation schemes, government
controlled provision of credit, and natural resource abundance (Mauro, 1998). Ades and
Di Tella utilize a cross sectional analysis of thirty one countries utilizing a variety of
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control variables and find that countries where firms enjoy higher rents tend to have
higher corruption levels (1999). Lastly, there is a preference by the suppliers of
corruption, bureaucrats or politicians, to benefit from existing sources of rent-seeking
rather than to create new forms of rent-seeking behavior (McChesney, 1997:24).
From a political-economic perspective, combating corruption is about changing
incentive structures. Many measures could accomplish this. On the demand side, scholars
have recommended scaling down regulations, streamlining the tax code, creating
transparency in the bureaucracy, and eliminating discretion on the part of the bureaucracy
(Kaufmann, 1997:128; Tanzi, 1998:590-591). To address the supply side of corruption,
scholars have recommended increasing public sector wages, implementing effective
monitoring systems, and changing the system of rewards and penalties (Bardhan,
1997:1330-1340; Klitgaard, 1998:77; Tanzi, 1998:590-591). Establishing a system of
perfect monitoring is costly, however. Therefore, a trade-off must be made between the
cost of monitoring and the cost of corruption. Completely eliminating corruption may
cost more in terms of monitoring agents than allowing some corruption to occur. Ideally,
an equilibrium point should be sought in which the cost of monitoring agents plus the
cost of corruption occurring is the lowest.
Many of these recommendations seem to imply neoliberal reforms as a solution to
corruption. Markets, however, may be an inadequate mechanism for controlling and
combating corruption. Privatization itself opens up multiple opportunities for actors to
engage in large scale corruption. Many of the states that appear as clean on Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index are not neoliberal states. It is likely that
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solutions for corruption will be context specific. Like economic development, there is not
a one size fits all solution.
There are criticisms of the political-economic theoretical perspective of
corruption. Actually modeling corruption could prove to be quite challenging.
Hypothetically, many variables interact in the cost function and the monitoring function
of corruption. To adequately do so, it would be necessary to know how much corruption
is occurring. Being a clandestine activity, this could prove to be difficult. Furthermore,
cultural and ethical beliefs will be absent from such a model. This will severely
undermine the predictive power of the model.
Cultural and ethical variables are largely ignored in this perspective. Ignoring
culture and ethics can undermine the predictive power of this theoretical perspective.
Imagine two bureaucratic situations. In the first, a great deal of discretionary power is
given to agents with a strong cultural or ethical bias against corruption. In the second,
less discretionary power is given to agents with no cultural or ethical bias against
corruption. In which situation will there be a higher incidence of corruption? We would
assume the second example, but this perspective may not be able to adequately answer
that question.
The next theoretical perspective on corruption is the sociocultural perspective.
This perspective emphasizes cultural traditions, social norms, and internalized values that
inform moral preferences and societal roles. In this perspective, individuals are pushed
toward corruption by the attributes of their internalized values and by the social norms
that exert influence on individuals (della Porta and Vannucci, 2012:12-14). In this
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theoretical perspective individuals are not assumed to be rational, utility maximizing
actors. Rather, actors are viewed as acting within a set of socially constructed norms that
prescribe behavior. This behavior can be ego centric or oriented toward group survival. It
can be bound by kinship groups, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or economic class.
Inherent in this model is the tension between an idealized Weberian bureaucracy
and more traditional modes of resource allocation. Due to this, corruption is judged based
upon Western norms of bureaucratic behavior. The danger in examining corruption in this
manner is that it can lead to ethnocentrism. In some political systems, actions that are
deemed as corrupt can serve to link groups to the emerging or modernizing state. So
while there may be a cost passed on in terms of the delivery of goods and services, the
potential benefit of linking citizens to the state through patronage networks is hard to
measure. Another problem with this theoretical perspective is that it becomes difficult to
separate the behavior of an agent and a group as a whole. If a bureaucratic agent engages
in corruption, does it mean the agent is culturally predisposed to corruption or is the agent
merely responding to an incentive structure that allows the agent to do so? Furthermore,
like many cultural or constructivist theories, it is difficult to determine the causal
direction due to the agent-structure problem.
Curbing corruption in this model comes down to changing cultural perspectives
and norms about corruption. If corruption stems from sociocultural systems, then
changing attitudes seems to be the only way to reduce corruption (Klitgaard, 1988:90;
Theobald, 1990:148). Building trust has also been shown to reduce corruption though
there are limitations of this approach in fractionalized states (Rothstein and Uslaner,
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2005). This makes the prospects for reducing or eliminating corruption very difficult, as
cultures do not tend to change quickly. Furthermore, this could be interpreted as telling
members of a group to behave in a more Weberian or Western manner. At best,
proponents of this theory of corruption would recommend patience and understanding
when dealing with a presumably corrupt bureaucracy and not expect dramatic change
over time. This stands counter to examples of successful anti-corruption campaigns.
Singapore provides an excellent example. Rife with corruption in the post-World War II
era, the newly elected People’s Action Party enacted the Prevention of Corruption
Ordinance and created an autonomous agency called the Corrupt Practices Investigation
Bureau. As a result, corruption was reduced to an “almost negligible proportion in
contemporary Singapore” (Quah, 1982:162-163).
The last theoretical explanation is the neo-institutional perspective. della Porta
and Vannucci (2012) provide an example of this theoretical perspective. This approach is
similar to the political-economic approach except that it attempts to incorporate macro
level phenomena and path dependency. By doing so, this theoretical explanation attempts
to bridge the micro-macro divide. Once a certain organizational structure and the cultural
norms that develop along with it are put into place, governance structures and
enforcement mechanisms develop within networks that conduct illegal actions. This
reduces uncertainty among actors and increases the chances that actors will engage in
illegal acts (12-14).
Since this theoretical perspective incorporates aspects of both the politicaleconomic theory of corruption and the cultural perspective of corruption, the situations in
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which corruption occurs in the neo-institutional perspective are shared between both
perspectives. Similarly, the recommendations for combating corruption under this
perspective are also shared with the other two theoretical perspectives.
Only by thoroughly examining the institutional settings and the history of past
corrupt practices can this perspective on corruption be utilized. In this sense, it is harder
to generalize from case to case because context matters a great deal. Due to this difficulty,
it is not likely that a general theory of corruption can be developed from the neoinstitutional perspective. Furthermore, corrupt acts typically occur in a clandestine nature.
This makes it difficult to fully utilize this theoretical perspective as it is unlikely a
research will have a complete understanding of the corruption occurring within a
contemporary bureaucratic structure. This method is better suited for historical cases of
corruption in which a more information is available for scrutiny.
After examining the strengths and limitations of each theoretical perspective, this
study will make use of a political-economic approach to corruption. It provides the best
opportunity to model corruption in a large-N data set and control for relevant variables
identified in the literature.

Determinants of Corruption
With a theoretical perspective selected, it is now important to discuss some other
factors that may have an impact on corruption. Once identified, these determinants can
then be measured and incorporated into the model that will be developed later in this
study. Scholarship has been conducted on the many different possible causes of
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corruption. The following were found to be determinants of corruption in other studies:
the level of democracy, the rule of law, gross domestic product per capita or poverty, the
size of the population, government consumption, trade openness, and ethnolinguistic
fractionalization.
Democracy has been shown to have a negative impact on corruption. If members
of a given polity are able to identify corrupt politicians and have them removed from
office, corruption should abate over time. There are many assumptions inherent to this
line of reasoning. First is the assumption that the means to expose corruption exist. The
right of a free press, which is important in exposing corruption, is one reason why
democracy may lower corruption. Another assumption is that the electoral process is free
and fair, allowing voters to punish parties that are unwilling or unable to tackle corruption
within the government. Utilizing data from a large set of countries over a fifteen year
period, Rock (2009) is able to show that an inverted U relationship exists between
democracy and corruption. In newer democracies, corruption tends to fall rather quickly.
In consolidated democracies, there is a tendency for corruption to increase slightly over
time. This means that it is absolutely necessary that a measure of democracy is included
in this research model. The predictability of the rules of the game are also important for
determining corruption. Consolidated regimes are more likely to have established rules in
place. Consolidated regimes may also be able to articulate preferences and exert more
leverage vis-à-vis private entities. Why is there a discrepancy between the empirical
findings of Rock and this theoretical assumption? Actors over time will adapt to changing
political and economic contexts. As a regime becomes consolidated, it develops more
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capacity. However, actors adapt to these changes and develop more sophisticated
methods of engaging in graft. Micro-level, incentive shaping factors will then come into
play to determine outcomes of corruption. Therefore, a measure for regime durability or
consolidation is necessary for a complete analysis of corruption though it is important to
understand that over long periods of time, its explanatory value will diminish.
Poverty exacerbates corruption because it undermines the ability of government
institutions to function effectively. Control of corruption, rule of law, government
effectiveness, voice and accountability, and political stability were all found to be
negatively impacted in strong ways by poverty rates (Tebaldi, 2010). When faced with
survival issues, government workers, as utility maximizers, are also likely to engage in
rent-seeking behavior in order to make ends meet. Furthermore, an impoverished country
is not likely to have the resources available to create a professional bureaucracy. Poverty
also creates an incentive to engage in corruption to improve income. Access to education
and sound legal systems are clearly undermined by poverty, impacting the decision
making of potential suppliers of corruption and the ability to hold suppliers of corruption
to account. The per capita income of a state can be used to capture this relationship.
The relationship between the size of a state’s population and corruption is a topic
of debate within the literature. There are a couple of theoretical reasons why one would
anticipate a higher level of corruption in states with more people. Many of these
theoretical arguments were analyzed and tested by Knack and Azfar (2003). First, a state
with more citizens has a larger demand for the provision of services, which are scarce.
Therefore, citizens may engage in corruption in order to gain access to a limited pool of
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state services. In more populous states there are also less government workers per citizen.
Therefore, citizens may be tempted to bribe government workers to jump ahead in a
presumed queue. The empirical results of the authors’ regression models were mixed,
however (10). They attribute this to selection bias in the data available from the
corruption measuring indexes. Many years have passed since this study, so it may be
appropriate to retest these relationships.
The amount of government spending might also influence the incentive to engage
in corrupt behavior. This is a tenet of classical liberalism where the state only distorts
economic activity. Economists of the public choice and the rent-seeking schools see most
government spending as inherently wasteful and prone to rent-seeking opportunism. Goel
and Nelson (1998) use a logit model to analyze panel data on the number of corruption
convictions in the United States and the size of state spending. Their results demonstrate
a positive and significant relationship between local government spending and corruption
convictions while controlling for many measures of judicial monitoring and enforcement
(115). In a separate study, Gupta et. al. (2001) seek to analyze the relationship between
military spending, government spending, and corruption for a data set of 120 countries
from 1985-1998. Their findings demonstrate a positive and statistically significant
relationship with military spending as a share of GDP, military spending as a share of
government expenditures, government procurement outlays as a percentage of GDP, and
government spending (759-771). These studies are not conclusive due to a focus on just
the United States in the former and a small sample size in the latter. However the logic is
straight forward. The more resources a state has at its disposal, the greater the incentive to
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engage in corrupt practices. Therefore, any model on corruption should include some
measure of government spending.
Trade openness has also been identified as having a negative impact on
corruption. Trade restrictions shift resources to rent seeking activities, which increases
corruption. Utilizing the International Country Risk Guide and Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Torrez (2002) finds a mixed relationship.
The negative relationship between the International Country Risk Guide and trade
openness was found to non-existent to weak depending on how openness is measured. He
does find the relationship holds with the Transparency International measure, but the
number of observations is very low.
Ethno linguistic fractionalization has been found to be highly correlated with
corruption in different studies. Controlling for various measures of bureaucratic
efficiency, Mauro (1995) finds that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is correlated with
corruption. The presence of different ethnic groups may lead bureaucrats to favor
members of their group over others (693). Dincer (2008) finds evidence that ethnic and
religious polarization and ethnic and religious fractionalization are also associated with
corruption in the United States controlling for educational attainment levels, income
inequality, and the size of the manufacturing sector. Like Mauro, Dincer argues that this
is due to the likelihood that members of a group will allocate resources to their own
group (98). Therefore, any model predicting corruption should include ethno linguistic
fractionalization to capture this effect.
To summarize, the above factors should be accounted for in any study of
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corruption. A failure to do so may create an omitted variable bias and decrease the
explanatory power of the model.

Conclusion
Three different theoretical perspectives on corruption have been identified in the
literature: political-economic, cultural, and neo-institutional. In order to make
generalizations across cases of corruption, this study will utilize a political-economic
theoretical perspective on corruption. The cultural and the neo-institutional models of
corruption require close attention to context and history, making generalizations from
case to case difficult. Furthermore, reviewing the empirical research record on corruption
shows that the political-economic approach is common and has generated a large body of
work on the determinants of corruption. This study will incorporate these finds to build a
statistical model to test whether or not natural resource endowments demonstrate a
significant relationship with perceptions of corruption.
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Chapter Four
The Resource Curse Theory and Corruption
What are the theoretical linkages between natural resources and corruption? From
a political-economic perspective, incentive structures provide the most insight into
determining the total level of corruption in a given state or economy. A state with a large
amount of natural resource endowments relative to its economy could provide both more
opportunities to engage in rent seeking behavior and greater gains from engaging in
corruption. Therefore, a clear theoretical link may exist between the political-economic
perspective on corruption and the resource curse theory. To examine whether this
potential link has merit, it is first necessary to examine the existing literature on the
resource curse theory. Once this literature has been reviewed, this chapter will build a
link between resource rents and corruption and construct a theoretical model to capture
this relationship.

The Resource Curse Theory
To sustain economic development, countries need access to natural materials that
can be exploited. The more richly endowed a country is, the greater the prospects for the
economic development of that country. This line of reasoning seems straight forward. If
one could choose a starting point from which to found a new country, one would likely
want ample farmland, timber, minerals, hydrocarbons, and any other resource useful for
providing for development. The management of these resources, whether through
cultivation, mining, or drilling, brings with it spillover into the broader economy. As
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these processes become more efficient due to market forces, economies of scale or simply
learning by doing, less labor will be required to produce the same if not greater output.
This should, in turn, also cause the prices of these commodities to fall. Because these
commodities are inputs to so many different goods, the overall price level should fall over
time. Meanwhile, the newly freed labor can be then shifted into different sectors in the
economy, which should respond to the growing demand for goods that are becoming
cheaper. As the resource endowments gradually diminish, as all certainly do, the output
that would have been generated is replaced by the output of both a more skilled
workforce and a more diversified economy. For all intents and purposes, this model put
forth by Ginsburg (1957) provides the argument for the conventional view of how a large
natural resource endowment should benefit a given country when it is in the early stages
of economic development.
There are many assumptions inherent to the model mentioned above. First, there
is an assumption that the efficiency benefits that occur in these economic sectors are
enjoyed in the host country. If the host country is not willing or able to turn these raw
commodities into finished goods for sale, will the host country benefit? A country that
exports copper ore but imports copper semiconductors, for example, is likely to pay more
for the semiconductor than it was paid for the copper ore. Should a country become
dependent on mineral extraction without a subsequent diversifying of the economy, it
may become burdened with a bloated mining sector or high unemployment. This can be
applied to other extractive sectors of the economy. What if the earnings from these
resources are not reinvested in the economy or distributed as wages to workers in the
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extractive sector? If these earnings are instead stolen through corruption, the natural
resource endowments may not provide the assumed benefits. Political violence can also
develop over land ownership rights that contain rich resource endowments. These
conflicts can lead to civil wars or secession movements. All of these outcomes will have a
negative impact not only on economic growth but also the political system in general. In
this scenario, when the resources begin to diminish, the hypothetical country could be set
up for a difficult situation.
The above criticisms of the conventional view of how resource endowments can
benefit early stage economic development form the basis of the resource curse theory as
it relates to growth and development. A great deal of scholarship has been done on this
subject. The post-World War II era provides a starting point to analyze the claims of this
theory as many countries became independent and sought to utilize their resource wealth,
if they had it, to pursue economic development. Using the geographical size of a country
as a proxy for resource endowments, Auty (1993:2) found that the smaller, and thus
resource deficient countries like Korea and Taiwan performed much better economically
than China, India, Brazil, and Mexico. Auty claims that all six of these countries began
with similar economic models, namely autarkic industrial policy or import-substitution
industrialization3. Korea and Taiwan, due to mineral deficiencies, quickly had to adopt a
more export oriented policy because of the negative terms of trade associated with a
reliance on commodity exports. Autarkic models of development require a great deal of
financing to support tariff regimes and other forms of protection. Therefore, these
3

Import-substitution industrialization refers to a strategy of economic development in which the state
utilizes trade barriers to encourage domestic production of goods for the internal consumer market. This
was prominent in Latin America from the 1950s until the 1970s.
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countries ran into foreign exchanges shortages more quickly than their resource rich
counterparts (Auty, 1993:2). Because South Korea and Taiwan switched to a more
competitive model quickly, fewer imbalances built up in their economies than in China,
India, Brazil, and Mexico. Therefore South Korea and Taiwan were better off as the
switch in economic models was more costly for the larger countries. Furthermore the
growth rates of South Korea and Taiwan during this period were much higher than those
of China, India, Brazil, and Mexico. Today these two countries enjoy a higher standard of
living as well. There are other reasons why this could have occurred, however. The
geopolitical decisions of the United States during the Cold War could have influenced
this outcome as well. Concerned about communist resistance movements developing in
East Asia, the United States provided special access to the United States domestic market
and development assistance to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The other four countries
in this case study did not receive this preferential treatment by the world’s largest
domestic market. Lastly, geographic size is a poor operationalization of resource wealth
as there are many resource deficient yet large countries like Chad and Niger.
The above framework operationalized resource wealth as a function of the actual
geographic size of a country. How does this thesis fare when it is made sector specific?
Are there characteristics of extractive industries that lend themselves to economic under
performance? Scholars have identified characteristics of these industries that can lead to
poor economic performance. The first relates to the amount of capital required to engage
in extractive activity. If we again begin in the post-World War II era, we find mineral rich
countries that lack the capital necessary to exploit these endowments. The capital must,
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then, come from developed countries. These sectors will employ a small portion of the
labor force and likely export the extracted resource without any value added labor. An
enclave economy is likely to develop, which will have limited to no linkages to the
domestic economy. Thus, spillover effects will be largely mitigated. Furthermore, the
earnings on the commodity exports can be lost to either the service on the foreign capital
investment or negative terms of trade (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; Auty, 1993:3).
Empirical research provides support to both of the above claims. Manzano and
Rigobon (2001) utilize scatter plot to show a relationship between resource abundance
and debt growth from 1975 and 1985. This study also shows a steep decline in the price
of many commodities over the same period (22-23). Many developing states leveraged
their resource wealth during this period, leaving them with high levels of debt. There is
also empirical evidence showing that the terms of trade between primary commodities
and manufactured goods has deteriorated since the Second World War. Utilizing data
from the United Nations and the World Bank, Spraos (1980) found that the terms of trade
between primary products and manufactured goods had declined since World War II
regardless of the data source (122). The model utilized by Spraos was scrutinized by
Sapsford (1985) for containing structural instability in the parameters used to analyze the
terms of trade over the period covered. Sapsford corrects for this by utilizing a CochraneOrcutt model to bridge the gaps between the two sub periods in Spraos’ work (783). The
new model confirms the findings of Spraos that the terms of trade between primary
commodity goods and manufactured goods declined until the 1980s. These results
generated a great deal of controversy in the economics literature due to its anti-orthodox
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policy prescriptions. A great deal of scholarship has been done to disprove these results,
yet they were confirmed again utilizing updated data that included observations up to
1986 (Sapsford et. al., 1992).
This does not mean, however, that this phenomenon is a predetermined outcome.
When extractive industries in developing states become captured and held hostage to
political interests, more efficient firms can be crowded out along with many of the other
problems listed above. Countries like Botswana, Chile, Malaysia, and Indonesia seem to
have been able to develop policies toward these industries that have kept them
competitive and effectively mitigated some of the problems that can occur with enclave
economies (Auty, 2006). These policies include reinvesting the earnings on natural
resource exports into light industry or manufacturing, educational services, and health
services. A more diversified economy, along with more educated and healthier workers,
has obvious benefits for an economy.
Hammond (2011) found evidence that government policy vis-a-vis the extractive
industry, in this case oil, may have a critical impact on future development. Hammond
compares Angola and Venezuela to demonstrate his thesis. Angola's resources were
opened up to foreign capital. A lack of state capacity and civil strife lead to a situation
where rent seeking proliferated. Politicians relied on bribery to retain a privileged
position in society. Well aware of the wealth of their country and the crushing poverty,
the citizens of Angola took up arms to try and change the political climate. A three party
civil war developed along with a succession movement in the oil rich region of
Cambinda. Venezuela under Hugo Chavez, however, has a nationalized extraction
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industry (PdVSA) that is exposed to market pressure, which keeps it lean. Venezuela is
then able to take its foreign exchange earnings from oil and redistribute the wealth, invest
in other sectors of the economy, invest in education, or invest in health services 4. This has
resulted in a reduction in the poverty level in the country, which in turn creates a larger
domestic market for producers to sell goods in. What can be said, in general, is that a
wide body of scholarship has demonstrated that resource rich states have demonstrated
lower growth rates since the end of colonialism.

Natural Resources and Corruption
As mentioned above, corruption is another important aspect of resource curse
theory. As the guarantor of property rights, states can be said to control access to the
natural resources within its territorial boundaries. The legal mechanisms to control access
to these resources, according to resource curse theory, are frequently undermined. This
can happen through a variety of mechanisms. First, bureaucrats could be tempted for
various reasons to accept a bribe to circumvent legal procedures. Second, firms may pay
bribes to secure privileged access to resources. Bureaucracies in many mineral rich
developing countries use rents to pay for access to these resources. Research has shown
that these bureaucracies lack accountability and transparency because of the reliance on
external funding. This reliance on outside money can also lead to policy positions
contrary to the welfare of the country as a whole but beneficial to individuals associated
with the bureaucracy. Furthermore, accurately recording revenue and enforcing laws

4

Specifically, Chavez created social programs called Missions that were funded by PdVSA earnings
(Daguerre, 2011).
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requires state capacity and strong institutions, which developing countries tend to lack.
This as a whole can lead to the formation of a rentier state or a state that utilizes
government revenue in a manner that does not benefit society.
A key question emerges at this juncture. Is the lack of institutional capacity at the
initial stages of resource extraction a cause or an effect of corruption? The resource curse
theory focuses exclusively on developing countries. In the modern context, firms from
developed countries are typically involved in extracting resources from developing
countries. Developing countries are generally capital poor and have to import machinery
and expertise to make effective use of their resources. Therefore, extraction generally
begins before mechanisms are in place to guard against corruption. In an environment
with limited capacity to monitor or regulate, the clientelistic relationships at the base of
corrupt networks can develop. Therefore, a lack of institutional capacity at the initial
stages of extraction can be an initial cause of corruption. Over time, however, corruption
can impact the development of the institutions required to reduce corruption. The
institutional capacity then becomes an effect of corruption.
With regard to mineral wealth, Matti (2010) provides a case study of how
corruption begins and continues to occur in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
(DRC). Extremely underdeveloped, the DRC is reliant on foreign firms to extract its vast
mineral wealth. It has very poor if nonexistent institutions. Multinational firms can offer
bribes, at a relatively low cost, that politicians are willing to accept to gain access to these
resources. Enclave economies develop around the mines with little to no spillover effect
into the broader economy. In this manner, the DRC is cursed by its resource wealth.
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Shaxson (2007) examines a similar process with regard to oil wealth in SubSaharan Africa. He finds that all oil producing states in Sub-Saharan Africa have below
average government effectiveness as measured by Kaufmann’s Government
Effectiveness Index and are at the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index. He finds that scholarship on the subject is limited in two ways. First, it
does not consider the systemic nature of the resource curse, i.e. the relationship between
developed and developing countries. Second, scholarship on this topic ignores cross
border corruption. Overall, Shaxson finds that governance matters most. Resource
endowments can be a necessary but not sufficient factor in perceptions of corruption.
Other scholarship has attempted to provide tests of the resource curse theory.
Leite and Weidmann (1999) find a strong, negative correlation between the International
Country Risk Guide corruption index and the share of fuel and ore exports as a
percentage of gross national product while controlling for rule of law, revolutions and
coups, and trade openness. In this corruption index a lower score means more corruption.
Utilizing data from eighty eight countries, Gylfason (2001) plots the percentage of the
labor force in the extractive sector with Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index and finds a strong and negative correlation between the two variables.
The larger the percentage of the labor force in the extractive sector, the lower the rating in
the Corruption Perceptions Index. In this index, a higher score means less corruption.
Fjelde (2009) utilized panel data from 123 countries from 1985 to 1999 and finds that oil
wealth is associated with higher corruption. In this study, Fjelde operationalized oil
wealth and oil production per capita and made use of the International Country Risk
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Guide to operationalize corruption.
Arezki and Brückner (2011) utilize panel data from thirty oil producing states
from 1992 to 2005 and find that the effect of oil rents on corruption depends on the
state’s involvement in the oil sector. States with high state participation faced higher
corruption while the effect was ambiguous in states with low amounts of state
participation in the oil economy. These scholars utilized Political Risk Services to
measure corruption and measured oil wealth as the amount of rents available (obtained
from the International Monetary Fund). Lastly, Askari, Rehman and Afraa (2012) find
that Islamic, oil exporting states have lower levels of corruption than states with similar
regimes that are non-Islamic, oil exporting states. The effect of culture on corruption can
be ambiguous. Rather, corruption is linked to poor business environments and weak
mechanisms for good governance. Overall, many of these studies do indeed find that a
resource curse exists with respect to oil. What about other natural resources? Does this
relationship hold for other sources of resource wealth or is the resource curse just an oil
curse?
There is some literature that casts doubt on the relationship between natural
resources and corruption. Utilizing data from the Corruption Perception Index from 19801985 and 1996, Di John (2011) finds that non-mineral abundant developing countries are
more corrupt than mineral-abundant countries. The perception of corruption in mineralabundant countries has more to do with the nature of the state and politics as well as the
structure of ownership in the export sector. If citizens view the industries as being foreign
owned or owned by a certain ethnic group, they are likely to describe the business
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environment as corrupt. These sentiments were recently expressed in Bolivia during the
events known as the “Gas War” (Kohl and Farthing, 2006). Perceptions or corruption are
lower if the firms are seen to be benefiting the citizenry.
While there is some contention in the literature, there seems to be a broad
theoretical basis and enough empirical research to support a relationship between
resource rents and corruption. While there appears to be gaps in the literature in terms of
disaggregated resource rents and the incorporation of many determinants of corruption as
identified by the literature, it is appropriate at this time to build a formal model linking
resource rents and corruption.

A Model of Corruption in the Extractive Sector
In the case of the extractive industry, corruption specifically means the collection
of bribes for the issuing of permits and licenses, allowing goods to pass through customs
or creating barriers to entry for competitors. This type of corrupt behavior may be called
rent-seeking behavior. In economic terms, this behavior is undertaken for two reasons;
suppliers of corruption want income, and demanders of corruption wish to avoid the
rigors of market competition (Lambsdorff, 2007:113-117). This definition can be placed
within a political-economic theoretical perspective. In doing so, this study may analyze
the incentive structures that give rise to corrupt behavior. Having a large natural resource
endowment can alter the incentive structure of bureaucrats and politicians which creates
the potential for increased corruption.
As noted previously, corruption is the outcome associated with rent-seeking and
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aversion to market competition. On the supply side, bureaucrats and politicians will seek
to maximize their utility by extracting rents from already existing sources. In this case,
the existing source is natural resource wealth. These politicians will take advantage of
their monopoly on regulation to extract favorable outcomes. On the demand side, firms
will seek to avoid as much market pressure as possible and maintain high profits. This
means bribing officials to gain or retain access to natural resources and blocking the entry
of new firms into the market.
The structure of a given market also has an impact in this model. Shafer (1994:23)
identifies two key aspects of a given sector's organization that influence leverage vis-àvis a state: capital intensity and the extent of economies of scale. Sectors that have high
capital intensity and benefit from economies of scale will have more leverage in terms of
capacity vis-a-vis a given governmental body in a developing state. This results primarily
from the resulting market structure, namely monopolistic competition or oligopoly. Under
these structural conditions, it is much easier for firms to form producer’s associations
than in situations where there is low capital intensity and no benefit from economies of
scale because the latter will tend to produce more firms. Firms in this resulting
“high/high” pairing of capital intensity and economies of scale can have more of an
influence on the functioning of the state, whether through lobbying or bribery. This study
assumes that it is more efficient, in terms of cost and outcomes, for a firm to bribe a
bureaucrat or politician than to use official channels of lobbying.
As a “high/high” industry, the extractive sector is very sensitive to state policy.
Frieden (1991) provides us with an analytical tool to utilize to determine whether or not

41

an industry is sensitive to state policy. Firms, being profit maximizers, will utilize any
leverage they have to maintain profitability. The degree to which they will use this
leverage is a function of how vulnerable the firm's holdings are to state policy. The more
susceptible a firm is, the higher the incentive to try to influence political outcomes.
Industries that are characterized by economies of scales, sunk costs, reputational costs,
and barriers to entry will be more sensitive to government policy (1991:20-21). This
should stand to reason. If a firm must invest in large, capital intensive factories to be
profitable, it will be unable, once the factory is built, to just close shop and relocate. It
will be too expensive to do so. Asset specificity is also an important aspect of a sector to
analyze. If a firm can easily shift its capital from one form of production to another, it
will do so if faced by the proper incentive structure. Firms with completely fluid assets,
like financial firms, can just move money around, forever chasing the highest return.
Firms with completely specific assets must remain within the same industry. The
extractive industry can clearly be said to meet the requirements of an industry in which
firms are sensitive to government policy. Extractive firms have large sunk costs and
benefit from economies of scale. The labor is very capital intensive. There are also high
barriers to entry. Finally, the assets associated with resource extraction can be said to be
specific.
Bringing all of this together, it becomes easy to see how, theoretically, one might
expect countries that are reliant on natural resources to be more corrupt. Natural resource
endowments are on a continuum. Some states have rich resource endowments, while
others have few resource endowments. This creates a scarcity in terms of where a firm
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may engage in extraction. Politicians are fully aware of this and attempt to gain the
maximum benefit from their resource endowments. Because developing countries rarely
have the capital necessary to extract the minerals themselves, they must look to foreign
firms. This makes them reliant on exogenous sources of funding, undermining
accountability to their polity. Being risk averse, these politicians would rather rely upon
already existing sources of rent-seeking rather than create new sources. These rentseeking opportunities could involve the allocation of permits, for example. Thus, they
will strive to ensure that the mining industry functions. This summarizes the supply side
of corruption.
On the demand side of corruption, extraction firms are very sensitive to
government policy. Having already invested heavily in exploration and the building of a
large capital stock, mining firms will utilize all means available to keep profit margins
high. Firms are thus faced with a choice. They must seek to influence policy through
legally sanctioned channels or through corruption. In developing countries, corruption is
likely the more efficient choice in terms of time, money and likelihood of success.
Corruption in this regard could include paying bribes to regulators that might enforce
environmental standards or to accountants trying to tax the revenue of a firm.
One last note needs to be made about the theoretical model. A country that has a
large extractive sector but also has the means to finish and manufacture the resources
should not suffer from resource curse theory like a state that does not. Being able to
manufacture these commodities into goods is a sign of a more diversified and advanced
economy. Resource curse theory tends to apply to countries that are just beginning to
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develop. Furthermore the more reliant a country is on the extractive sector, the higher the
incentive to engage in corrupt practices. Therefore it is important to look at the amount of
rents available in a given extractive sector as a percentage of gross domestic product
rather than the volume of rents available. For the sake of completeness, it will also be
important to look at the percentage of resource exports as a percentage of total exports.
This will help identify differences in states that export large amounts of low rent
resources and states that export high rent resources.

Conclusion
This chapter builds upon the previous chapters of this study by building a
theoretical bridge between natural resource rents and corruption. Many questions remain
about the systemic relationship between the resource rents and corruption, however.
Namely, is there a difference in how different natural resource rents affect perceptions of
corruption? If there is a difference, what can explain it? In the following chapters,
statistical models will be built to test the relationship between resource rents and
corruption. The methodology of the study and the methods of obtain data will be covered.
The results of the models and the inferences to be drawn from them will follow.
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Chapter Five
Methodology and Data
Dependent Variable
To fully examine the relationship between resource endowments and corruption,
this paper constructs a cross sectional time series for all countries measured by
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2012) from 1994-2012.
Beginning in 1995, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has
utilized survey data to rate countries on how pervasive corruption is within the country.
Johnston (2001) identifies the CPI as the most widely used and the most ambitious effort
to measure and compare perceived levels of corruption (160). Specifically, Johnston
notes that the CPI is both reliable in terms of the standard deviation of the scores and
valid in terms of being related statistically with other measures of perceptions of
corruption (161, 164-165). This does not mean that the measure is without fault. In terms
of precision, it is difficult to evaluate whether the variation across all values are
consistent or not. Furthermore, the CPI does not accurately reflect contrasts in the types
of corruption (162-164). Husted (1999) identifies another potential problem with the CPI.
The measures reflect the opinions of outsiders that work for business, nongovernmental
organizations, or intergovernmental organizations. They do not measure the opinions of
people within the given society. Also, the CPI measures corruption that occurs between
outsiders and state agents, not corruption that occurs within a state (347). These issues
aside, the measure is the best available for researchers and is widely used in many
academic studies, thus, this study uses the CPI as the measure for the dependent variable.
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Before moving on to the independent variables, it is important to analyze the way
the CPI is constructed. Currently, the CPI draws upon data from thirteen different sources
to create the composite index. Each source will be briefly covered by examining the
instruments utilized to collect data. The first source used by the CPI is the African
Development Bank’s Governance Ratings (African Development Bank Group, 2012).
These ratings assess the transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector
in 53 African states. Specifically, they measure the accountability of the executive to
oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance, access of civil
society to information on public affairs, and state capture by narrow vested interests. The
second source used by the CPI is the Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable Governance
Indicators (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2011). This source focuses on 31 OECD states. This
measure assesses the extent to which public officeholders as prevented from abusing their
position for private interests. The third source used by the CPI is the Bertelsmann
Foundation Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2013). Scoring 128 states and
territories, this index focuses on two main questions. First, the study asks to what extent
are public officeholders who abuse their positions prosecuted or penalized. Second, the
study asks to what extent does the government successfully contain corruption.
The fourth source used by the CPI is the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
Country Risk Ratings (The Economist Group, 2013). The EIU was established in 1946 as
the research body for The Economist. Containing 144 states and territories, this data
source rates states and territories based on the following eight criteria:
1. Are there clear procedures and accountability governing the allocation and use
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of public funds?
2. Are public funds misappropriated by ministers/public officials for private or
party political purposes?
3. Are there special funds for which there is no accountability?
4. Are there general abuses of public resources?
5. Is there a professional civil service or are large numbers of officials directly
appointed by the government?
6. Is there an independent body auditing the management of public finances?
7. Is there an independent judiciary with the power to try ministers/public
officials for abuses?
8. Is there a tradition of a payment of bribes to secure contracts and gain favors?
Combined, these questions help to capture many different aspects of corruption within a
state.
The fifth source used by the CPI is the Freedom House Nations in Transit data set
(Freedom House, 2012). These data focus on 29 states throughout Central Europe and
several newly independent states. Specifically, six dimensions are examined by this data
set:
1. Has the government implemented effective anti-corruption initiatives?
2. Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration
requirements, and other controls that increase opportunities for corruption?
3. Are there adequate laws requiring financial disclosure and disallowing conflict
of interest?
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4. Does the government advertise jobs and contracts?
5. Does the state enforce an effective legislative or administrative process –
particularly one that is free of prejudice against one’s political opponents – to
prevent, investigate, and prosecute the corruption of government officials and
civil servants?
6. Do whistleblowers, anti-corruption activists, investigators, and journalists
enjoy legal protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of
bribery and corruption?
Similar to the EIU, these data present a robust system for analyzing the prevalence of
corruption that exists within a given state.
The sixth source used by the CPI is the Global Insight Country Risk Ratings (GI)
(IHS, 2013). Founded in 1959, the GI provides a six factor analysis of the risk
environment in 204 states and territories. With respect to corruption, GI focuses on the
manner in which corruption affects the operational activities for businesses. Specifically,
GI is interested in obtaining business permits, the policy environment, and planning
decisions. The seventh source used by the CPI is the IMD World Competitiveness Year
Book (International Institute for Management Development, 2013). Scoring 59 states,
respondents were asked whether or not bribing and corruption exists within a state. The
eighth source used by the CPI is the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (Political
and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd., 2013). This firm specializes in strategic business
information and analysis for companies doing business in 15 countries in East and
Southeast Asia. To provide sound information to clients, this firm analyzes corruption
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along two dimensions. The first dimension of the study is the extent to which corruption
is perceived to be a problem in the following positions: national-level political leaders,
city and other local-level political leaders, civil servants at the national level, and civil
servants at the city level. The second dimension of the study is the extent to which
corruption is perceived to be a problem affecting the following institutions: the police
department, the court system, customs, the taxation bureau, government licensing bodies,
inspections bodies, and the military.
The ninth source used by the CPI is the Political Risk Services International
Country Risk Guide (The PRS Group, 2013). This research monitors 140 states and asks
survey respondents to rate the prevalence of actual or potential corruption with respect to
excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, exchange of favors, secret party funding,
and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. The tenth source used by the
CPI is the Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey (Transparency International,
2013). This survey measures the degree to which public officials demand or accept bribes
and the degree to which public funds are misused for private gain. Business executives
from 30 countries are surveyed and interviewed in the creation of this data. The World
Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment serves as the eleventh source utilized
in the creation of the CPI (The World Bank Group, 2012). This assessment measures
transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector for 78 IDA-eligible
states. The World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey serves as the twelfth
source used by the CPI (World Economic Forum, 2013). This survey measures the
frequency in which firms must make undocumented extra payments or bribes for the
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following services: imports and exports, public utilities, annual tax payments, awarding
of public contracts and licensing, and obtaining favorable judicial decisions. The subjects
of this survey are business executives, with nearly 100 executives surveyed per each of
the 140 economies sampled. The last source used by the CPI is the World Justice Project
Rule of Law Index. Containing expert responses from 97 states, this index measures the
extent to which public officials use public office for private gain in the following sectors:
the executive branch, the judicial branch, the police and the military, and the legislature.
The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) uses the
results from these previous thirteen sources and combines them to create a composite
score that ranges from zero to ten. A zero represents a perfectly corrupt state. A ten
represents a perfectly clean state. This is the most comprehensive measure for corruption
found in the literature and is widely used in many empirical studies. The result of the
composite score is a string variable that allows this study to utilize an ordinary least
squares regression model.

Independent Variables
The first set of explanatory variables in this study represents a measure of the
amount of resource rents, the difference between the cost of production and the sale price,
earned as a percentage of gross domestic product. These rent measures are expressed as a
percentage of GDP. The first rent measure captures the total amount of resource rents
extracted in a given economy. These data are then disaggregated into five components:
coal rents, forest rents, mineral rents, natural gas rents, and oil rents. The second set of
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explanatory variables captures the amount of fuel exports as a percentage of total
merchandise exports and the amount ores and metals exports as a percentage of total
merchandise exports. This data is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (2012).
The next set of variables are control variables for covariates identified in the
literature as determinants of corruption. The first set of controls relate to democracy and
regime durability. The measure of democracy and the measure for regime durability
comes from the Polity VI Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2012). The democracy measure
captures institutional features and places states on a scale from -10 to 10 with -10 being
the most authoritarian and 10 being the most democratic. This paper uses the Polity2
measure as it is more amendable to time series analysis. Regime durability is a count
variable that counts the number of years a regime has been in place.
The overall level of economic development is an important determinant of
corruption. Gross domestic product is the standard measure of development. The natural
logarithm of GDPPC will be used to fit the observations in a linear model. A larger share
of government consumption may also create increased opportunities for rent seeking. To
capture this, this study will utilize the measure for government consumption spending as
a percentage of total consumption spending. A larger population is associated with a
higher degree of corruption due to increased demand of scares government resources. The
logarithm of population will be used to fit the observations to a linear model. Lastly,
openness, measured as imports and exports over GDPPC, has been identified as being
associated with less corruption. If corruption is treated like a cost to operating then prices
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will be affected. A market that is opened up to international trade must have competitive
prices or be put out of business. Therefore, openness should decrease corruption. The
measures for GDPPC, government consumption, population, and openness are all
obtained from the Penn World Table Verson 7.1 (Heston, et. al., 2012). Lastly, ethno
linguistic fractionalization has been identified as having a positive relationship with
corruption.
This study uses a primarily political-economic model to predict perceptions of
corruption. However, certain socio cultural characteristics can inform micro-level
decision making. The first characteristic to be incorporated is ethno linguistic
fractionalization. The measure for ethno linguistic fractionalization was obtained from
Alesina, et. al. (2003). This measure captures the probability that two individuals selected
at random from a country would be from a different ethno linguistic group. This data was
taken from a 2003 study; however the values are slowly changing and will not vary much
over time. Therefore these values were assigned to the entire country during the period of
the study. Previous studies have linked ethno linguistic fractionalization to higher levels
of corruption, so this study incorporates this measure.
Certain regional dummies were also incorporated into model to attempt to capture
aspects of regional regime characteristics. This study identified four particular regions of
the international system of interest: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and
the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. 5 Eastern
Europe and Central Asia underwent a rapid transition from state socialism to capitalism
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nearly 50,000 medium-scale and large-scale
5

See appendix for breakdown of regions.
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enterprises were privatized during the first few years of this transition (Kaufmann and
Siegelbaum, 1997). This created a unique opportunity through which wide spread graft
and corruption could occur. In Latin America and the Caribbean, neopopulism has been
identified as a factor that influences corruption. Neopopulist leaders typically seek to
bypass established political parties and make direct appeals to the people. These direct
appeals are typically broadcast through television, making neopopulism a costly method
of attracting votes. This can increase the incentive to engage in corruption (Weyland,
1998). In the Middle East and North Africa, sultanistic modes of rule, in which the
distinction between the state and the regimes becomes blurred, allow for increased
opportunities for corruption to occur. This is due to the amount of discretionary power
these rulers have and the narrow social base that supports the regime (Lucas, 2004).
Similar to sultanistic regimes, in the neopatrimonial regimes common to sub-Saharan
Africa the state emerged “as an extension of the ruler’s household” (Leiken, 1996:64).
Therefore, patronage, ethnic ties, kinship ties, and bribes became the major methods of
governance. These regional dummy variables will help to capture these unique
characteristics that undoubtedly shape the micro-level decision making of actors.

Statistical Methodology
As noted previously, the data is arranged into a cross sectional time series. The
descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables can be found in Table
A1. Pooled data are prone to heteroskedasticity. Therefore, the model is estimated with
ordinary least squares regression and panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz,
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1995). The panels are unbalanced, so it will be necessary to use pairing to determine the
variance. A Prais-Winsten regression revealed a very high rho (above 0.75), which
demonstrates auto correlation in the data set. To account for this, it was necessary to
estimate the model with a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable in the
model (Beck and Katz, 1996). Doing so dramatically increased the R-squared of the
model but significantly decreased the auto correlation in the dependent variable (the
Prais-Winsten rho dropped to 0.03). This suggests that estimation of the model with the
lagged dependent variable successfully controlled for serial correlation in the data set.
To assess multicollinearity, a variance inflation factor test was used as well. The
scores ranged from 2.59 to 1.25 with a mean VIF for the entire model of 1.61. The VIF
scores are well within tolerance. Summed residuals of all the models were analyzed to
check for unit effects that may be exhibiting a strong effect in the model. None of the
summed residuals were more than five times the mean of the dependent variable, which
suggests it was necessary to model fixed effects. To account for endogeneity, all
independent variables were time lagged one year. Finally, the resource curse is said to
impact developing states, therefore this model will only be looking at states that are not
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Asia
is omitted as the reference category because the theoretical literature did not offer a clear
hypothesis about states and corruption in this region.

Hypotheses
With the methodology of the statistical model covered, it is now appropriate to
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introduce the hypotheses to be tested in this study. As the reviews of the various
literatures have shown, a clear theoretical link can be made between corruption and
natural resource abundance. Yet there are gaps in the literature. Many studies did not test
for the relative reliance of an economy on resource rents. This study will do so using
measures of resource rents. Specifically, theory would predict that the more capital
intensive and scarce a resource, the higher the probably of corruption to occur. In terms
of exports, fuel exports, due to capital intensity and scarcity, should be associated with
higher levels of corruption for similar reasons as non-renewable rents.

Hypothesis One: Capital intensive and non-renewable natural resource
endowments should demonstrate a positive association with perceptions of corruption.

Hypothesis Two: A greater reliance on fuel exports relative to total exports should
be associated with higher levels of corruption.

Different institutional features of a state have been shown in various studies to
have differing influences on the pervasiveness of corruption. Namely, democracy has
been shown to be able to help curb corruption. Furthermore, the stability of a regime
could influence the ability of actors in an environment to be able to predict future
interactions. The nature of the stability is a function of the type of regime. Because of
this, an interaction variable will be used, multiplying the polity score with regime
durability. A durable democracy should have less corruption, whereas a durable
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authoritarian regime should have more corruption.

Hypothesis Three: Higher levels of democracy should be associated with lower
levels of corruption.

Hypothesis Four: The interaction variable of democracy and regime durability,
with higher scores being related to long standing democracies and lower scores being
associated with long standing autocracies, should have a negative effect on corruption.

Economic influences should also demonstrate an effect on corruption. First,
openness, an indirect manner of judging the exposure of an economy to the international
price mechanism, should put pressure on corrupt states through competition. Therefore,
openness should be associated with lower levels of corruption. A greater pool of
resources to distribute through patronage a graft can change the incentive to engage in
corruption. Therefore, a larger amount of government consumption spending relative to
total consumption spending could be associated with higher levels of corruption. Lastly,
higher levels of gross domestic product per capita alter the incentive structure by
changing the opportunity cost. A higher wage level should, therefore, be associated with
lower levels of corruption.

Hypothesis Five: Higher levels of openness should be associated with lower levels
of corruption.

56

Hypothesis Six: Higher levels of government consumption spending as a
percentage of total consumption spending should be associated with higher levels of
corruption.

Hypothesis Seven: A higher gross domestic product per capita should be
associated with lowers levels of corruption.

The last set of hypotheses are related as socio-cultural influences. First, ethnolinguistic fractionalization can lead to favoritism and patronage on behalf of one’s group.
Therefore, higher levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization should be associated with
higher levels of corruption. A larger population increases the competition for state
resources. A higher level of scarcity increases the demand on goods and services. This
changes the incentive structure to engage in corruption by altering the opportunity cost.
Lastly, regional variables have been included to try to capture shared societal norms and
common historical experiences.

Hypothesis Eight: A higher level of ethno linguistic fractionalization should be
associated with higher levels of corruption.

Hypothesis Nine: A larger population should be associated with higher levels of
corruption.
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Hypothesis Ten: States located in Central Asia should have higher levels of
corruption due to the transition from state socialism to market capitalism.

Hypothesis Eleven: States located in Eastern and South Eastern Europe should
have higher levels of corruption due to the transition from state socialism to market
capitalism.

Hypothesis Twelve: States located in Latin America and the Caribbean should
have higher levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with neopopulist
modes of rule.

Hypothesis Thirteen: States located in Northern Africa and the Middle East should
have higher levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with sultanistic
modes of rule.

Hypothesis Fourteen: States located in Sub-Saharan Africa should have higher
levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with neo-patrimonial modes of
rule.

To test these hypotheses, the following equation will be used to estimate levels of
perceived corruption:
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Perceived Corruption = B1*Perceived Corruptiont-1 + B2*Resource Rent/Exportt-1 +
B3*Polity2t-1 + B4*Regime Durabilityt-1 + B5*(Polity2t-1*Regime Durabilityt-1) +
B6*Government Consumptiont-1 + B7*Trade Opennesst-1 + B8*Ethno linguistic
fractionalization + B9*Logarithm of Populationt-1 + B10*Logarithm of GDPPCt-1 +
B11*Central Asia + B12*Eastern and Southeastern Europe + B13*Latin America and the
Caribbean + B14*Middle East and North Africa + B15*Sub-Saharan Africa

Conclusion
This study has attempted to utilize the best common practices in statistical
modeling to test the above hypotheses. Special attention was paid to the different measure
to try and capture the desired variables in the best manner possible. Based upon the
model outlined in Chapter Four, this study anticipates that capital intensive and nonrenewable resources, due to asset specificity and relative scarcity, will have more of an
effect on corruption than non-capital intensive, recyclable, or renewable resources. This
study also anticipates that micro-level measures that shape the incentive structure of
engaging in corrupt behavior will have more of an influence on the aggregate level of
perceived corruption than structural measures. The next chapter will provide a detailed
discussion of the various statistical regressions utilized to test these hypotheses.
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Chapter Six
Results and Analysis
In this chapter the results from eight regression models will be analyzed. Each
model will be analyzed individually. After analyzing all eight models, generalizations
will be made about possible systematic relationships across all models.
Before discussing the substantive variables in each model, an important issue
needs to be covered. As noted in Chapter Five, due to serial autocorrelation in dependent
variable, this study estimated each model with a lagged dependent variable. The
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is significant in all eight models, and it
accounts for a great degree of the variation in perceptions of corruption 6. Even with this,
some independent variables still demonstrate a significant and theoretically predicted
relationship with the dependent variable.

Resource Rents Models
The first model to be analyzed is the total rents model. In this model, total natural
resource rents is the main independent variable of interest. It should be recalled here that
with the Transparency International data for corruption higher values are associated with
lower levels of perceived corruption. As anticipated by the resource curse theory, the
coefficient for larger percentage of natural resource rents relative to gross domestic
product is correlated with higher levels of perceived corruption. While an important

6

The standardized regression coefficient (beta) for the lagged DV has the following values in the eight
regression models in the order that they appear: 0.921614, 0.9227602, 0.9385789, 0.9320781, 0.9322331,
0.9149208, 0.9012009, 0.9190365. Adding the lagged dependent variable changes the adjusted R-squared
of the models by an average of 0.3384.
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Table 1: Total Rents Model 7
Coef.

Corruption
Perception

0.9112012***

Panelcorrected Std.
Err.
0.023178

Total Rents

-0.0025815***

0.0007872

-3.28

0.001

-0.0041243

-0.0010387

0.0064818**

0.0031452

2.06

0.039

0.0003174

0.0126462

Regime Durability

0.0007828

0.0008705

0.90

0.369

-0.0009234

0.0024889

Polity*Durability

-0.0001332

0.0000819

-1.63

0.104

-0.0002936

0.0000273

0.002631

0.0016491

1.60

0.111

-0.0006011

0.005863

0.0005728**

0.0002887

1.98

0.047

6.92e-06

0.0011387

Ethno linguistic
Fractionalization

-0.191477

0.041635

-0.46

0.646

-0.1007509

0.0624554

Log of Population

0.0013971

0.0101124

0.14

0.890

-0.184227

0.021217

Log GDPPC
Con 2005

0.0903987***

0.0253941

3.56

0.000

0.0406271

0.1401703

Central Asia

0.0418421

0.0564132

0.74

0.458

-0.0687258

0.1401703

Eastern and
Southeastern Europe

-0.0242396

0.0491086

-0.49

0.622

-0.1204907

0.0720115

Latin America and
Caribbean

-0.0657668

0.0507566

-1.30

0.195

-0.1652479

0.0337143

Middle East and
North Africa

0.0205656

0.0408966

0.50

0.615

-0.0595902

0.1007214

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.0830359*

0.0457186

1.82

0.069

-0.0065708

0.1726426

Constant
Adjusted R-squared
Wald chi-squared
Prob > chi-squared
Rho
Observations
Groups

-0.5491589**
0.9470
139161.70
0.0000
0.0334422
1276
126

0.2589804

-2.12

0.034

-1.056751

-0.0415667

Polity2

Government
Consumption
Openness

z

p<|z|

95% Conf. Interval

39.31

0.000

0.8657731

0.9566293

*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01

7

See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories.
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lower levels of perceived corruption. As anticipated by the resource curse theory, the
coefficient for larger percentage of natural resource rents relative to gross domestic
product is correlated with higher levels of perceived corruption. While an important
finding, this does not shed much light on the original hypothesis. To adequately test the
original hypothesis, the disaggregated natural resource rent measure will need to be
analyzed.
The covariates for institutional influences display mixed results in the total rents
measures. The coefficient for the Polity measure of democracy performs as expected.
Higher levels of democracy are associated with lower levels of perceived corruption.
Regime durability does not show a significant relationship with levels of perceived
corruption. The interaction term created from the measure for democracy and regime
durability does not demonstrate a significant relationship with perceptions of corruption.
The next group of independent variables in the total rents model capture the effect
of economic influences. The coefficients for two variables demonstrate a significant
relationship with corruption. The first is openness. A higher degree of openness to trade is
associated with lower levels of perceived corruption. The second variable that
demonstrates a significant relationship with corruption is gross domestic product per
capita. The coefficient for GDP per capita (logged) show that higher levels of average
income are associated with lower levels of perceived corruption. The coefficient for
government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption spending is not
significant
The final group of independent variables can be categorized as socio-cultural
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variables. One regional dummy variable, sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates a significant
relationship with perceptions of corruption. Compared to Asia, sub-Saharan African states
are less likely to be corrupt. The coefficient for ethno linguistic fractionalization does not
demonstrate a significant relationship with perceptions of corruption. The coefficient for
population of a state is also insignificant.
The second model to be covered is the coal rents model (Table 2). The coefficient
for coal rents demonstrates that a larger percentage of coal rents as a percentage of gross
domestic product is associated with a higher level of perceived corruption. Theoretically,
this is expected. Coal is a non-renewable natural resource, which increases scarcity.
Furthermore, coal extraction and processing is capital intensive, which is also
theoretically relevant in terms of asset specificity.
Compared to the total rents model, the coefficients for institutional variables
demonstrate a different relationship with perceptions of corruption in the coal rents
model. Like the total rents model, the coefficient for the Polity measure of democracy is
positive and significant. The interaction term for level of democracy and regime
durability also does not demonstrate a relationship with perceptions of corruption.
Interestingly, the coefficient for regime durability does demonstrate a signification
relationship with perceptions of corruption. Specifically, the older the regime, the lower
the levels of perceived corruption.
The covariates for economic influence also behave in a different manner in the
coal rents model. The coefficient for gross domestic product per capita is positive and
significant. A higher income level is correlated with lower levels of perceived corruption.

63

Table 2: Coal Rents Model 8
Coef.

Corruption
Perception

0.8972682***

Panelcorrected Std.
Err.
0.0237945

z

p<|z|

95% Conf. Interval

37.71

0.000

0.8506319

0.9439045

Coal Rents

-0.0126043**

0.055658

-2.26

0.024

-0.0235132

-0.0016955

Polity2

0.0094266*

0.0052

1.81

0.070

-0.0007653

0.0196185

Regime Durability

0.0022458**

0.0009853

2.28

0.023

0.0003146

0.0041769

Polity*Durability

-0.0001938

0.0001297

-1.49

0.135

-0.0004479

0.0000603

Government
Consumption

0.0044385

0.0032245

1.38

0.169

-0.0018814

0.0107583

Openness

-0.0000205

0.0006173

-0.03

0.973

-0.0012304

0.0011893

Ethno linguistic
Fractionalization

-0.0249866

0.0823223

-0.30

0.761

-0.1863353

0.1363621

Log of Population

-0.0230916

0.0166388

-1.39

0.165

-0.055703

0.0095199

Log GDPPC
Con 2005

0.0883388***

0.0308159

2.87

0.004

0.279408

0.1487369

Central Asia

-0.0281618

0.0619841

-0.45

0.650

-0.1496484

0.0933248

Eastern and
Southeastern Europe

-0.0721124

0.0571582

-1.26

0.207

-0.1841406

0.0399157

Latin America and
Caribbean

-0.0989304

0.0723563

-1.37

0.172

-0.2407461

0.0428853

Middle East and
North Africa

-0.037345

0.0659762

-0.57

0.571

-0.166656

0.091966

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.0249053

0.0518865

0.48

0.631

-0.0767904

0.1266009

Constant
Adjusted R-squared
Wald chi-squared
Prob > chi-squared
Rho
Observations
Groups

-0.043021
0.9471
36824.80
0.0000
0.0487814
575
51

0.2657054

-0.16

0.871

-0.5637941

0.4777521

*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01

8

See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories.
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Openness, however, is not associated with perceptions of corruption in the coal rents
model. This differs from the total rents model. Lastly, government consumption spending
as a percentage of total consumption spending is not significantly associated with levels
of perceived corruption.
None of the coefficients for socio-cultural variables are statistically significant in
the coal rents model. The coefficients for ethno linguistic fractionalization, population,
and the regional dummies are all insignificant. This suggests that the population size and
region of states with coal rents are not related to perceptions of corruption.
The forest rents model (Table 3) is the first statistical model that involves a
renewable natural resource. Furthermore, compared to the other types of resource rents
examined in this study, forest rents are the least capital intensive and the least capital
specific. Therefore, the theoretical model developed in Chapter Five would lead one to
expect that forest rents will not be associated with corruption. Not surprisingly, the results
from regression model three show that the coefficient for forest rents is not significant.
The measures of institutional influences perform in a manner comparable to the
total rents model. The coefficient for Polity is once again positive, demonstrating that a
higher degree of democracy is associated with lower levels of perceived corruption. The
coefficients for regime durability and the interaction term of regime type and regime
durability are not significant.
Economic influences in the forest rents model also behave in a manner
comparable to the total rents model. The coefficients for openness and gross domestic
product per capita are both positive and significant, suggesting a positive relationship
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Table 3: Forest Rents Model 9
Coef.

z

p<|z|

0.9246258***

Panelcorrected Std.
Err.
0.0210227

43.98

0.000

0.883422

0.9658295

0.0026211

0.0048422

0.54

0.588

-0.0068695

0.0121117

0.0088453***

0.003347

2.64

0.008

0.0022854

0.0154052

Regime Durability

0.0009233

0.0008766

1.05

0.292

-0.0007948

0.0026414

Polity*Durability

-0.0001026

0.000083

-1.24

0.216

-0.0002654

0.0000601

Government
Consumption

0.0012074

0.0015094

0.80

0.424

-0.001751

0.0041658

Openness

0.000677**

0.0002958

2.29

0.022

0.0000972

0.0012568

Ethno linguistic
Fractionalization

-0.0746594*

0.0430005

-1.74

0.083

-0.1589389

0.00962

Log of Population

0.0053826

0.0099921

0.54

0.590

-0.0142016

0.0249668

Log GDPPC
Con 2005

0.0489687*

0.0250923

1.95

0.051

-0.0002112

0.0981486

Central Asia

0.0357307

0.0513743

0.70

0.487

-0.0649611

0.1364224

Eastern and
Southeastern Europe

0.0153303

0.0507935

0.30

0.763

-0.0842231

0.1148838

Latin America and
Caribbean

-0.045842

0.0530118

-0.86

0.387

-0.1497433

0.0580592

Middle East and
North Africa

0.0090076

0.0430651

0.21

0.834

-0.0753984

0.0934136

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.0681194

0.0425639

1.60

0.110

-0.0153044

0.1515432

Constant
Adjusted R-squared
Wald chi-squared
Prob > chi-squared
Rho
Observations
Groups

-0.3357232
0.9450
499176.02
0.0000
0.0332701
1254
123

0.2569984

-1.31

0.191

-0.8394308

0.1679844

Corruption
Perception
Forest Rents

Polity2

95% Conf. Interval

*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01

9

See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories.
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with perceptions of corruption. The coefficient for government consumption spending as
a percentage of total consumption spending is not significant. Finally, the coefficient for
ethno linguistic fractionalization is negative and significant, as expected.
Table 4 presents the results for the mineral rents model. In terms of the theory,
mineral extraction, processing, and smelting are definitely capital intensive. The
difference is that minerals are not non-renewable. While there are diminishing returns to
recycling, many different types of mineral resources are not consumed forever once they
are smelted and finished. Theoretically, this means that purchasing recycled metals can be
an alternative to buying extracted ore. This may reduce the leverage of those officials
who seek to control mineral rich lands to extract bribes. Therefore, the relationship
between mineral rents and corruption may not be that strong. The statistical results lend
support to the theory. The coefficients for mineral rents is not significant.
The effects of the institutional variables in the mineral rents model display the
same pattern as the total rents model. Again, the coefficient for Polity is positive and
significant, suggesting a higher level of democracy is associated with lower levels of
perceived corruption. The coefficients for the other two institutional variables, regime
durability and the regime type-regime durability interaction term are not significant.
The mineral rents model does suggest that economic influences are potentially
important to understanding corruption. A higher level of openness and gross domestic
product per capita are associated with lower levels of perceived corruption, however
government consumption as a percentage of GDP has no demonstrable effect on
perceptions of corruption. None of the coefficients for the socio-cultural variables were

67

Table 4: Mineral Rents Model 10
Coef.

z

p<|z|

0.9278682***

Panelcorrected Std.
Err.
0.0211536

43.86

0.000

0.886408

0.9693284

-0.0020306

0.0018669

-1.09

0.277

-0.0056896

0.0016284

0.0084535**

0.0033541

2.52

0.012

0.0018796

0.0150273

Regime Durability

0.0007608

0.0008742

0.87

0.384

-0.0009526

0.0024741

Polity*Durability

-0.0001283

0.000083

-1.55

0.122

-0.000291

0.0000344

Government
Consumption

0.0016724

0.0015753

1.06

0.288

-0.0014151

0.00476

Openness

0.0005323*

0.0002865

1.86

0.063

-0.0000292

0.0010939

Ethno linguistic
Fractionalization

-0.0396114

0.0416355

-0.95

0.341

-0.1212155

0.0419927

Log of Population

0.0006435

0.0098992

0.07

0.948

-0.0187587

0.0200456

Log GDPPC
Con 2005

0.05799***

0.0207754

2.79

0.005

0.017271

0.0987089

Central Asia

-0.0010199

0.053715

-0.02

0.985

-0.1062994

0.1042596

Eastern and
Southeastern Europe

-0.0101269

0.0492248

-0.21

0.837

-0.1066056

0.0863519

Latin America and
Caribbean

-0.0653345

0.05143

-1.27

0.204

-0.1661353

0.0354664

Middle East and
North Africa

0.007309

0.04096

0.18

0.858

-0.0729712

0.0875891

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.0528193

0.0408802

1.29

0.196

-0.0273045

0.1329431

Constant
Adjusted R-squared
Wald chi-squared
Prob > chi-sqaured
Rho
Observations
Groups

-0.3240802
0.9462
1.16e+06
0.0000
0.0343497
1276
126

0.230544

-1.41

0.160

-0.7759381

0.1277778

Corruption
Perception
Mineral Rents

Polity2

95% Conf. Interval

*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01

10

See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories.
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significant in the mineral rents model.
The remaining two natural resource rent models are both non-renewable. These
models are presented in Tables 5 and 6. The first is the natural gas rents model. Like coal,
natural gas is a non-renewable resource. This could give leverage to those in control of
property rights to extract bribes. Furthermore, the extraction and refining of natural gas is
capital intensive and the capital is largely asset specific. As a result, firms engaged in
natural gas might be sensitive to policy and more likely to accede to demands for bribery.
The results from the regression model show that the coefficient for natural gas rents are
indeed negative and significant, suggesting that natural gas rents are associated with
higher levels of perceived corruption.
Like many of the previous resource rent models, higher levels of democracy are
again associated with lower levels of perceived democracy in the natural gas rents model.
Again the regime durability and the interaction variable between regime type and regime
durability are insignificant.
However, economic variables perform in a different manner than the total rents
model. The coefficient for gross domestic product per capita is positive and significant,
suggesting that higher levels of wealth per person is associated with less corruption.
Unlike the total rents model, however, a higher degree of openness is not significantly
related to lower levels of perceived corruption. Government consumption again fails to
achieve statistical significance. Lastly, none of the socio-cultural variables are statistically
significant.
The final resource rent model is the oil rents model (Table 6). The theoretical
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Table 5: Natural Gas Rents 11
Coef.

z

p<|z|

0.9217238***

Panelcorrected Std.
Err.
0.0217521

42.37

0.000

0.8790905

0.9643572

-0.00166**

0.0007576

-2.19

0.028

-0.0031449

-0.0001751

0.0071272**

0.0032881

2.17

0.030

0.0006827

0.0135717

Regime Durability

0.0005753

0.007875

0.73

0.465

-0.0009681

0.0021187

Polity*Durability

-0.0001164

0.0000848

-1.37

0.170

-0.0002826

0.0000499

Government
Consumption

0.0023471

0.0020048

1.17

0.242

-0.0015822

0.0062765

0.00496

0.0003301

1.50

0.133

-0.000151

0.001143

Ethno linguistic
Fractionalization

-0.0669748

0.0588305

-1.14

0.255

-0.1822804

0.0483309

Log of Population

-0.0034937

0.11148

-0.31

0.754

-0.0253433

0.0183559

Log GDPPC
Con 2005

0.0742981***

0.0214037

3.47

0.001

0.0323476

0.1162485

Central Asia

-0.0082627

0.0541625

-0.15

0.879

-0.1144192

0.0978938

Eastern and
Southeastern Europe

-0.0376209

0.0442842

-0.85

0.396

-0.1244164

0.0491746

Latin America and
Caribbean

-0.0821441

0.0510682

-1.61

0.108

-0.182236

0.0179478

Middle East and
North Africa

-0.151465

0.0483307

-0.31

0.754

-0.109873

0.07958

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.0357208

0.0433535

0.82

0.410

-0.0492505

0.1206922

Constant
Adjusted R-squared
Wald chi-squared
Prob > chi-squared
Rho
Observations
Groups

-0.3366698
0.9494
89009.21
0.0000
0.039055
1081
97

0.2301312

-1.46

0.143

-0.7877187

0.1143791

Corruption
Perception
Natural Gas Rents

Polity2

Openness

95% Conf. Interval

*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01

11

See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories.
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perspective behind the relationship between oil rents and levels of corruption is nearly
identical to the natural gas model. The only difference is that the global economy is much
more reliant on oil than natural gas. Therefore, the level of scarcity of oil compared to
natural gas is much greater. The effect of oil rents on the level of perceived corruption
should be greater than that of natural gas rents. The results of the regression model
confirm this expectation. The coefficient for oil rents is negative and significant,
suggesting the higher the level of oil rents, the higher the level of perceived corruption.
The institutional variables do not perform as expected in the oil rents model. The
coefficient for Polity is significant and positive. The coefficient for the interaction term is
significant but negative. This suggests that long standing democratic regimes are more
likely to be corrupt than long standing autocratic regimes. This is an unexpected finding.
A possible explanation is that long standing semi-democracies (ranging from a Polity2
score of 1 to 5) could be driving this relationship. Additional research is necessary to
fully understand this relationship.
There is continuity between the total rents model and the oil rents model in terms
of the performance of economic variables. The coefficient for openness is significant and
positive. The coefficient for gross domestic product per capita is statistically significant
and is associated with lower levels of perceived corruption. Like the total rents model, the
coefficient for government consumption is not significant, while the coefficients for the
socio-cultural variables are also insignificant except of the regional dummy variable for
sub-Saharan Africa. Again, states in sub-Saharan Africa are less likely to be corrupt than
states in the omitted category (Asia Pacific).
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Table 6: Oil Rents Model 12
Coef.

Corruption
Perception

0.9029485***

Panelcorrected Std.
Err.
0.025503

z

p<|z|

95% Conf. Interval

35.41

0.000

0.8529636

0.9529335

Oil Rents

-0.0041498***

0.001498

-2.77

0.006

-0.0070858

-0.0012138

Polity2

0.0056815*

0.0032239

1.76

0.078

-0.0006373

0.0120003

Regime Durability

0.0008195

0.0007951

1.03

0.303

-0.0007388

0.0023779

Polity*Durability

-0.0001474*

0.0000847

-1.74

0.082

-0.0003135

0.0000186

Government
Consumption

0.0025331

0.0016917

1.50

0.134

-0.0007826

0.0058489

Openness

0.0006006*

0.000331

1.81

0.070

-0.0000481

0.0012493

Ethno linguistic
Fractionalization

-0.0341542

0.0585999

-0.58

0.560

-0.1490079

0.0806994

Log of Population

-0.0018229

0.0106256

-0.17

0.864

-0.0226487

0.019003

Log GDPPC
Con 2005

0.1079842***

0.0313314

3.45

0.001

0.0465757

0.1693927

Central Asia

-0.007537

0.0478116

-0.16

0.875

-0.1012489

0.086172

Eastern and
Southeastern Europe

-0.0408432

0.0449231

-0.91

0.363

-0.1288908

0.0472045

Latin America and
Caribbean

-0.0699765

0.0489702

-1.43

0.153

-0.1659563

0.0260033

Middle East and
North Africa

0.0137178

0.0460956

0.30

0.766

-0.0766278

0.1040635

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.0877484*

0.0524387

1.67

0.094

-0.0150296

0.1905264

Constant
Adjusted R-squared
Wald chi-squared
Prob > chi-squared
Rho
Observations
Groups

-0.6040522**
0.9501
193658.11
0.0000
0.04146
1099
100

0.2608393

-2.32

0.021

-1.115288

-0.0928166

*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01

12

See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories.
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The previous six models utilized resource rents measures to operationalize a
state’s reliance on natural resources for economic output. Another way to measure the
reliance of a state on natural resource exports is to examine the export portfolio of a state.
Two measures were available through the World Bank: fuel exports as a percentage of
total merchandise exports and ores and metals exports as a percentage of total
merchandise exports. These two measures were employed along with the covariates used
in models 1 – 6. The results of these trials are presented in Tables 7 and 8.
The first export model captures the relationship fuel exports and corruption (Table
7). In terms of the theoretical perspective of this study, fuel exports should behave in a
similar manner as coal rents, natural gas rents, and oil rents. Fuel exports are inherently
non-renewable. Furthermore, the extraction and processing of fuel exports require
significant capital investments. Therefore, fuel exports should be associated with higher
levels of perceived corruption. The results of the regression model confirm this
relationship. As one can see in Table 7, the coefficient for fuel exports is negative and
significant.
None of the institutional variables are significant. In this sense, the fuel export
model behaves much like the oil rents model. The economic variables, however, perform
much in the same way as they have in many of the other models. The coefficient for
openness is close to the threshold of significance (p < 0.107). The coefficient for gross
domestic product per capita is positive and significant. Again, this finding points to
openness and higher levels of wealth per person being associated with lower levels of
perceived corruption, ceteris paribus.
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Table 7: Fuel Exports Model 13
Coef.

Corruption
Perception

0.8858579***

Panelcorrected Std.
Err.
0.0282579

z

p<|z|

95% Conf. Interval

31.35

0.000

0.8304735

0.9412423

Fuel Exports

-0.0022327***

0.0007575

-2.95

0.003

-0.0037174

-0.0007479

Polity2

0.0031309

0.003537

0.89

0.376

-0.0038014

0.0100632

Regime Durability

0.0006648

0.0009017

0.74

0.461

-0.0011204

0.0024321

Polity*Durability

-0.0001071

0.00091

-1.18

0.239

-0.0002854

0.0000712

Government
Consumption

0.0025889

0.0028477

0.91

0.363

-0.0029924

0.0081703

Openness

0.000549

0.000341

1.61

0.107

-0.0001194

0.0012174

Ethno linguistic
Fractionalization

-0.0484594

0.051511

-0.94

0.347

-0.1494191

0.0525002

Log of Population

-0.0042453

0.0126754

-0.33

0.738

-0.0290886

0.0205979

Log GDPPC
Con 2005

0.1313477***

0.0394155

3.33

0.001

0.0540949

0.2086006

Central Asia

-0.0165389

0.0712227

-0.23

0.816

-0.1561328

0.123055

Eastern and
Southeastern Europe

-0.0556053

0.0557899

-1.00

0.319

-0.1649515

0.0537409

Latin America and
Caribbean

-0.091878

0.056232

-1.63

0.102

-0.2020907

0.0183347

Middle East and
North Africa

-0.0002178

0.0529215

-0.00

0.997

-0.103942

0.1035064

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.1034502*

0.0568492

1.82

0.069

-0.0079722

-0.02148726

Constant
Adjusted R-squared
Wald chi-squared
Prob > chi-squared
Rho
Observations
Groups

-0.6505405**
0.9420
52675.20
0.0000
0.0458516
1065
108

0.3264856

-1.99

0.046

-1.29044

-0.0106405

*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01

13

See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories.
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Table 8: Ore and Metals Exports Model 14
Coef.

z

p<|z|

0.9067237***

Panelcorrected Std.
Err.
0.0250469

36.20

0.000

0.8576328

0.9558147

0.0007633

0.0006638

1.15

0.250

-0.0005377

0.0020643

0.0073445**

0.0035675

2.06

0.040

0.0003523

0.0143368

Regime Durability

0.0007579

0.0009296

0.82

0.415

-0.0010641

0.0025798

Polity*Durability

-0.0001129

0.0000909

-1.24

0.214

-0.0002911

0.0000653

Government
Consumption

0.0037072

0.0026678

1.39

0.165

-0.0015216

0.0089359

Openness

0.0006366*

0.0003433

1.85

0.064

-0.0000362

0.0013093

Ethno linguistic
Fractionalization

-0.0808438

0.0497719

-1.62

0.104

-0.1783949

0.0167072

Log of Population

-0.004903

0.0118304

-0.41

0.679

-0.0280902

0.0182842

Log GDPPC
Con 2005

0.0857653***

0.0305397

2.81

0.005

0.0259086

0.1456219

Central Asia

-0.0384888

0.0704671

-0.55

0.585

-0.01766017

0.0996241

Eastern and
Southeastern Europe

-0.0442199

0.0550573

-0.80

0.422

-0.1521302

0.0636904

Latin America and
Caribbean

-0.099223*

0.0557589

-1.78

0.075

-0.2085085

0.0100625

Middle East and
North Africa

-0.0120944

0.050516

-0.24

0.811

-0.111104

0.0869152

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.0666345

0.0469404

1.42

0.156

-0.0253669

0.1586359

Constant
Adjusted R-squared
Wald chi-squared
Prob > chi-squared
Rho
Observations
Groups

-0.3859561
0.9425
54794.21
0.0000
0.0376715
1081
108

0.2662232

-.145

0.147

-0.907744

0.1358319

Corruption
Perception
Ores and Metals
Exports
Polity2

95% Conf. Interval

*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01

14

See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories.
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Like some of the other models, the sub-Saharan Africa regional dummy variable
is positive and significant. Again, states in sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to be less
corrupt than the omitted region. The coefficient for Latin America and the Caribbean
approaches the threshold for significance (p < 0.102) and is negative. Latin American and
Caribbean states may be more corrupt than the omitted region.
The second export model is the ores and metals exports model (Table 8). The
relationship between ores and metals exports and corruption is hard to predict. While
capital intensive and asset specific, ores and metals rents are not non-renewable resources
and are, in general, not as scarce. Therefore, they may not be a systematic relationship
between these exports and corruption. The results from the regression show that ores and
metals exports are not systematically related to perceived levels of corruption, as
suggested by the coefficient
Of the institutional independent variables, the coefficient for the Polity is positive
and significant. A higher level of democracy is again associated with lower levels of
perceived corruption. The economic variables perform as expected. Openness and gross
domestic product demonstrate the same relationship as they have in most of the models.
A higher degree of openness and a higher average wage are associated with lower levels
of perceived corruption. The coefficient for Latin American and Caribbean states is
negative and significant, suggesting that states in this region are more likely to have
higher levels of perceived corruption compared to the omitted region.
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Summarizing the Results
With all the models covered, it is now possible to make comparisons across the
models. Table 9 presents the findings for various covariates across the different models.
The table shows the number of times a covariate achieved statistical significance (by
level of significance). The study draws upon this table to review the hypotheses. In
particular, this study uses these results to examine whether the statistical findings lend
support to each hypothesis.
Table 9: Statistical Significance Counter
Levels of Significance
Total Rents

p<|0.1|
0

p<|0.05|
0

p<|0.01|
1

Total
1

Coal Rents

0

1

0

1

Forest Rents

0

0

0

0

Mineral Rents

0

0

0

0

Natural Gas Rents

0

1

0

1

Oil Rents

0

0

1

1

Fuel Exports

0

0

1

1

Ores and Metals Exports

0

0

0

0

Polity2

2

4

1

7

Regime Durability

0

1

0

1

Polity*Durability

1

0

0

1

Government Consumption

0

0

0

0

Openness

3

2

0

5

Ethno linguistic Fractionalization

1

0

0

1

Log of Population

0

0

0

0

Log GDPPC Con 2005

1

0

7

8

Central Asia

0

0

0

0

Eastern and Southeastern Europe

0

0

0

0

Latin America and Caribbean

1

0

0

1

Middle East and North Africa

0

0

0

0

Sub-Saharan Africa

0

0

0

0
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Hypothesis One: Capital intensive and non-renewable natural resource
endowments should demonstrate a positive association with perceptions of corruption.

Hypothesis Two: A greater reliance on fuel exports relative to total exports should
be associated with higher levels of corruption.

After reviewing the results of the statistical models, this study provides data in
support of hypothesis one and two. Coal rents, natural gas rents, oil rents, and fuel
exports all demonstrated a clear relationship with perceptions of corruption, while forest
rents, mineral rents, and ores and metals exports did not. This finding shows that capital
intensity may not matter. Rather, the primary driver of corruption may the non-renewable
nature of energy rents and exports.
Why might this be? Actors on both sides of a corrupt exchange are well aware of
the eventual fate of coal, natural gas, and oil extraction and production. These resources
are non-renewable and have a short time horizon. This can alter the incentive structure in
which bureaucrats, politicians, and private actors interact within. Knowing that the
resource will eventually be depleted, bureaucrats and politicians may be more willing to
solicit and accept bribes. This could be out of self-interest or out of a desire to make sure
that some of the money to be made from these resources will make it back to their
communities.
Another explanation may be found on the firm side. Anticipating high profit
margins in the long term, with energy demands increasing every year, firms may be
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willing to pay out bribes to any state actor that can increase their likelihood of obtaining a
permit or to obtain ownership of an energy resource. Considering the profits at stake,
firms may be willing to pay absorbent bribes. The size of the bribe could change the
likelihood of a bureaucrat or a politician to accept it or decline it.
Granted, the decision for a bureaucrat to defect depends on other variables as
well. The probably of getting caught and the subsequent punishment involved could be a
strong influencing agent against corruption. The moral or ethical standards of an
individual bureaucrat or politician also matter in this regard. Hypothetically, there may be
agents that are simply incorruptible. The existence of these rents, however, can alter the
incentive structure for all actors, making corruption on average more likely.

Hypothesis Three: Higher levels of democracy should be associated with lower
levels of corruption.

Hypothesis Four: The interaction variable of democracy and regime durability,
with higher scores being related to long standing democracies and lower scores being
associated with long standing autocracies, should have a negative effect on corruption.

Analysis of Table 9 shows that the Polity measure of regime type is significant in
seven out of eight models. Therefore, this study provides fairly robust evidence in
support of hypothesis three.
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There are many theoretical reasons why democracy should reduce levels of
perceived corruption. The first reason relates to the function that democracy performs.
Democratic systems of government place pressure on public officials to be accountable or
they will be disciplined at the polls. Corruption and the negative consequences attributed
to it can and should serve as a reason for a polity to become disaffected and vote out
officials that are seen to be corrupt. Elections can also give incentives to politicians to
discipline or clean up bureaucracies that are viewed as being corrupt.
Aside from the mechanical aspects of democracy, there are associated
characteristics of democratic regimes that can be associated with lower levels of
corruption. Freedom of the press is an important political right in democratic systems. A
free press can investigate corruption and expose it without fear of retribution. Therefore,
the more press freedoms, the more likely corruption can be exposed and corrected.
Being accountable to the people, democratic regimes are also more likely to have
more transparency. This could include maintaining a system for entering documents and
information into public record. This enables interactions between agents and firms to be
open to scrutiny. Public hearings and open bidding processes are other examples of types
of transparency that can make corruption easier to identify and expose.
Unlike hypothesis three, hypothesis four should be rejected. Statistical evidence
does not support a relationship between regime type and regime durability and levels of
perceived corruption. Theoretically, there may be no link between regime durability and
corruption. While a great deal of the variation in corruption is explained by the level of
corruption the previous year, this may have nothing to do with the longevity of a regime.
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Rather, the relationship could have more to do with the underlying incentive structures
and expectations of behavior that exist within a bureaucracy or an industry. It is quite
possible that linkages between a given regime and bureaucracy or industry may be weak,
such that one does not have much of an impact on the other.

Hypothesis Five: Higher levels of openness should be associated with lower levels
of corruption.

Hypothesis Six: Higher levels of government consumption spending as a
percentage of total consumption spending should be associated with higher levels of
corruption.

Hypothesis Seven: A higher gross domestic product per capita should be
associated with lowers levels of corruption.

The findings of the various statistical models provide support for hypothesis five
and seven. A higher degree of openness was associated with lower levels of perceived
corruption in five of the eight models. A higher level of gross domestic product per capita
was associated with lower levels of corruption in all eight of the models. Nevertheless,
hypothesis six cannot be confirmed based upon the statistical evidence.
Openness is associated with lower levels of corruption. The more open an
economy is to trade, the more it is exposed to international prices. If corruption is
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internalized as a cost of business, this cost will be reflected in the price of a good.
Therefore, ceteris paribus, a “clean” good should be priced at a lower level than a “dirty”
good. Over time, firms that are engaged in corruption should be out priced by more
efficient competitors. This could vary based upon market structure, however. Under
conditions of perfect competition, this would certainly be the case. In market structures in
which the firm has more market power, like oligopoly or monopolistic competition, this
effect may be mitigated or not as pronounced. Cartel style practices, such as those of
OPEC member states and diamond firms, could mitigate the effect of openness through
their influence on the supply of goods.
A higher level of gross domestic product per capita influences the underlying
incentive structure that exists within an economy to engage in corruption. Higher per
capita income tends to be associated with higher wages. A higher wage level, in general,
should reduce the incentive to engage in corruption by reducing the relative payoff.
Granted, much of this depends on the probability of getting caught and the punishment
associated with getting caught. Yet gross domestic product per capita can also offer
insight into state capacity. A higher level of gross domestic product per capita reflects a
larger tax base from which a state can procure resources. These resources can be
mobilized to create a more capable and powerful state. This capacity could be reflected in
a state having adequate monitoring capabilities with respect to enforcing the law and
policing relations between state officials and firms.
Based on the findings of this study, it appears that higher levels of government
spending are not associated with higher levels perceived corruption. While a larger pool
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of government consumption may increase the opportunities to engage in graft, the
likelihood of an actor doing so may depend more on the opportunity cost and the
probability of getting caught, which captured in the gross domestic product per capita
measure.

Hypothesis Eight: A higher level of ethno linguistic fractionalization should be
associated with higher levels of corruption.

Hypothesis Nine: A larger population should be associated with higher levels of
corruption.

Hypothesis Eleven: States located in Eastern and South Eastern Europe should
have higher levels of corruption due to the transition from state socialism to market
capitalism.

Hypothesis Twelve: States located in Latin America and the Caribbean should
have higher levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with neopopulist
modes of rule.

Hypothesis Thirteen: States located in Northern Africa and the Middle East should
have higher levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with sultanistic
modes of rule.
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Hypothesis Fourteen: States located in Sub-Saharan Africa should have higher
levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with neo-patrimonial modes of
rule.

Based upon the findings of this study, the data do not provide support for
hypotheses eight through fourteen. The socio cultural measures, ethno linguistic
fractionalization and population size, are not statistically related to perceptions of
corruption in enough of the statistical models to suggest confirmation. The regional
dummy variables are not significant in enough models to confirm hypotheses ten through
thirteen. The coefficient for the regional dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa was
significant in three of the eight statistical models, but the relationship was in the opposite
direction. While the comparative literature did not suggest a basis for higher levels of
corruption in Asia Pacific outside of autocratic practices (which is captured by the Polity
measure for regime type), the Asia Pacific region may not serve as an adequate omitted
category for comparison. Future studies may benefit from including OECD states and
using OECD member states as the omitted category.
Theoretically, ethno linguistic cleavages in a given society can provide a basis
from which identity is formed. If these cleavages are strong and meaningful, interactions
between groups may be infrequent and fraught with mistrust. At the aggregate level, this
could lead to a situation in which group favoritism corrupts state policy. Specifically,
bureaucrats or politicians may utilize their positions of power or authority to skew the
distribution of goods or services.
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The ability to do so, however, is primarily a function of other interceding factors.
First and foremost is the regime type. Democratic systems of government and their
associated characteristics can prevent systematic discrimination from developing. The
first characteristics are a free press and free speech. As covered above, these allow such
corrupt and discriminating activities to be identified and corrected. Another characteristic
of democratic systems of government is equality under the law. Democracies typically
embrace a rational-legalistic position which separates the individual from the office they
hold. This is usually mandated by law with punishments for violation.
The ability of ethno linguistic fractionalization to influence corruption is also
dependent upon the overall wealth of a state, which can be operationalized by using gross
domestic product per capita. First, a wealthier state is likely to have greater capacity to
enforce the law, which will change the opportunity cost of engaging in corrupt or
discriminatory practices. Second, a higher gross domestic product per capita is bound to
be associated with a higher wage level throughout the state. State bureaucrats are likely to
benefit from that as well. A higher wage level can alter the incentive structure of
engaging in a corrupt act for reasons explained above. Lastly, to engage in discriminatory
corruption it is necessary to have a pool of goods and services to distribute from.
Therefore, ethno linguistic fractionalization can be interceded by the size of government
spending and the availability of rents.
The population size of a country was thought to influence the incentive structure
facing a bureaucrat or politician wanting to engage in a corrupt act. A larger pool of
people depending on the goods or services increases the potential profit that can be made
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from engaging in corruption. Much like ethno linguistic fractionalization, the underlying
incentive structure is influenced by other factors. The ability of population size to
influence levels or corruption is also relative to the level of poverty. In a state with a large
population but a low level of wealth, the incentive to engage in corruption may very well
be enhanced. In a state with a large population and a high level of wealth, on the other
hand, the incentive structure may not be changed at all.
As stated above, the results for the regional dummy variables were not consistent
enough to provide support for hypotheses ten through thirteen. Regime characteristics
may indeed play an influencing role on the culture of politics and the behaviors and
norms that develop within bureaucracies and political systems. However, the evidence
from this study suggests that other factors have a stronger relationship with perceptions
of corruption. Higher levels of democracy, trade openness, and gross domestic product
per capita all have the ability to reduce many of the negative aspects of neopatrimonialism, neopopulism, sultanistic rule, and the transition to a market economy
from state socialism. Democratic governance, over time, can make a regime more
accountable to the needs of the enfranchised population. This, along with the press
freedoms and transparency associated with democratic governance, can provide the
populace with a mechanism to undermine the clientelistic networks that lay at the heart of
neo-patrimonialism, neopopulism, and sultanistic rule. Trade openness, through the
pressure of the price mechanism, can reduce the ability of corrupt firms, if the cost of
corruption is internalized into the price of a good, to remain competitive.
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Conclusion
The statistical models from this chapter show that non-renewable natural
resources are statistically related to higher levels of perceived corruption while
controlling for other relevant variables. This confirms the main theoretical expectation of
this study. Furthermore, this study finds that a higher level of democratic governance,
trade openness, and gross domestic product per capita are all associated with lower levels
of perceived corruption. Taken together, these variables show that incentives structures,
most of which can be considered economic incentives, seem to have the most influence
over levels of perceived corruption.
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Chapter Seven
Policy Implications and Conclusions
This study has demonstrated that there is some merit to the resource curse,
although the curse may not be as robust as it has been made out to be. Through the
literature review on the resource curse theory, it is clear that studies have found that a
reliance on natural resource earnings does have a negative relationship with economic
growth. The findings in the literature are so consistent that a formal test of this
relationship was not necessary for this study.
With regard to the relationship between corruption and natural resource
endowments, the findings of this study partially confirm the resource curse theory.
Consistent with what was expected by this study, perceptions of corruption are related to
the more capital intensive and non-renewable resources. Coal rents, oil rents, natural gas
rents, and fuel exports all demonstrate a significant relationship with perceptions of
corruption at the systemic level. The less capital intensive and renewable natural
resources demonstrate no statistical relationship with corruption.
What are the broader implications of these findings? Citizens and policy makers
alike should pay close attention to the institutions and structures that regulate capital
intensive and non-renewable industries. Specifically, mechanisms should be in place to
minimize the ability to engage in corrupt behavior. One such strategy has been adopted
by Norway since the discovery of hydrocarbons in the late 1960s. When designing the
institutions that would manage the oil sector, Norway specifically separated the
commercial side, the policy side, and the regulatory side of the industry from one another
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(Thurber, et. al., 2011). The strength of this reform is that is separates the various powers
from one another, making it more difficult to corrupt the sector as a whole. If just one
aspect became corrupt, the other two can work to correct this problem. Democratic
institutions and a professional bureaucracy work to reinforce this arrangement. Whether
this arrangement would survive in an autocratic regime or with an underdeveloped
bureaucracy is unknown. This is due to the many challenges facing developing states.
Norway has the legal institutions and the resources to implement and monitor such a
division of labor within the bureaucratic structures that govern the hydrocarbon industry.
Furthermore, the state government is already rated as clean by Transparency International
and the state does embraces the Weberian model of an ideal, rational-legal bureaucracy.
Implementing this strategy without taking into account the differences in state capacity
and enforcement could be problematic. The core finds of this study are that micro-level
incentive structures have the greatest influences on outcomes related to corruption
Another possible strategy to combat corruption in the non-renewable resource
sector is to design institutional mechanisms to promote openness and transparency. After
all, corruption thrives in situations with information asymmetry. There are several points
in the relationship between a state and a firm engaged in the non-renewable sectors that
require scrutiny. The first point is the bidding and licensing process that a firm must go
through to obtain the right to explore or extract. The second point is during the creation of
the contractual arrangement between the firm and the state. The third point is during
revenue management, revenue collection and revenue distribution. The fourth point
relates to the governance structure of the bureaucratic structures charged with monitoring
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the industry.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) represents an avenue
states can pursue to aid in this endeavor. Founded in 2003, EITI is a mutli-stakeholder
initiative that involves states, multinational firms, state owned enterprises, international
financial organizations, and civil society groups interested in increasing transparency in
the extractive sector. This initiative is voluntary and enables independent verification of
dealings within the extractive sector of a state (Al Faruque, 2006:70-73). Twenty states
are currently members, though this study does not test to see whether membership in
EITI is effective in reducing perceptions of corruption.
Lastly, the statistical findings of this study offer insights into how to combat
corruption in the extractive sector of the economy. First and foremost, the extractive
sector should be exposed to democratic oversight and the scrutiny of a free press. Second,
the sector should be open to competition. Third, we should ensure that bureaucrats
working in the sector responsible for governance of the extractive sector are well
compensated to reduce the incentive to engage in corruption. The statistical models of
this study suggest that these strategies should help to lower corruption over time.
There are limitations to these findings, however. Based on the findings of this
study and based upon theoretical reasoning, the greatest predictor of perceptions of
corruption in a given state is the level of perceived corruption in the previous year.
Therefore, a long term view is required to provide the maximum amount of leverage on
the research question. This study attempts to make use of the best data available, but
coverage of the CPI only runs from 1994 until the present day. As more data is collected,
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this study can be replicated to retest the various hypotheses.
A second limitation of this study is an inability to completely trace the causal
relationship between wealth and corruption. There is a circular relationship between the
two concepts. Corruption reduces economic growth. Low levels of economic
development increase corruption. This creates a vicious cycle in which states can get
trapped in a poverty/corruption trap. How can scholars and policy makers properly
address this problem? Reducing corruption in the relevant bureaucratic structures seems
to be the most cost effective strategy. If a bureaucracy in a given state could be cleaned
up, it could shape the expectations of firms and citizens over time. An independent
monitoring system, perhaps implemented by an impartial nongovernmental organization,
may be able to assist in this endeavor.
A third limitation to this study is that the model can only be applied to sectors that
are capital intensive and involve non-renewable resources facing an increasing demand
curve. Natural resources seem to be the only goods that can be described in this manner.
These resources are then inputs to the creation of other goods and services. Therefore,
this theoretical model can only be adequately applied in the primary sector of the
economy. The consequences of the corruption that occurs in these sectors does have an
impact in the broader economy, but this model cannot predict and assess those impacts.
Key questions still remain about the resource curse, however. This opens up
opportunities for further research. First, how does the number of firms in a sector interact
with perceptions of corruption? Does having more firms in a sector make corruption
worse or does it lessen corruption? Theoretically, having more firms in a given sector
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should reduce the leverage of each individual firm within the sector due to reduced
market power. This study did not incorporate data on the number of firms in a sector and
could be strengthened by doing do. Second, how does the ownership of the firms affect
corruption? Are state owned firms or private firms more likely to produce higher levels of
perceived corruption? State owned enterprises and private firms could operate under a
different system of logic, therefore changing the manner in which they interact with
bureaucracies. A coding system for determining the degree of state ownership versus
private ownership could be incorporated into this study to shed light on this relationship.
Do foreign firms behave differently than domestic firms? Foreign firms are less
accountable to the host state, thereby reducing the costs of engaging in corruption. Again,
data may be available to incorporate this into the paper and test whether foreign or
domestic firms have a different impact on the overall level of perceived corruption. Each
of these questions could provide an excellent opportunity for scholars to tease out more
nuances.
In closing, the resource curse theory should be revised. Based on the findings of
this study, the resource curse theory would be more appropriately named a fuel curse
theory. Coal rents, natural gas rents, oil rents, and fuel exports were the only rent
measures to have consistent findings with respect to corruption. This is due to two
primary factors. The first is asset specificity. These industries are capital intensive and
asset specific. This makes firms in these sectors extremely sensitive to state policy as they
cannot simply transfer capital from one industry to another. Second, these resources are
non-renewable and have a fixed quantity. As energy demands continue to grow and
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supply continues to diminish, the price will continue to increase unless alternative
sources of energy capable of meeting demand are developed. In light of this reality, actors
in these industries are able to take advantage of the scarcity of the resource to extract
bribes. The ability to do so is, according to this study, primarily a function of the existing
incentive structure. Reducing corruption, therefore, is related to changing the incentive
structure faced by actors in that arena.
The resource curse is not a permanent problem that natural resource rich state
must endure forever. Rather, sound policy and public scrutiny can work to mitigate this
curse and ensure that the citizens of resource rich states can benefit from their resource
endowments. Economists and political scientists alike can make a meaningful difference
in the lives of many of the world’s peoples by joining this endeavor and working to
promote non-renewable sectors that are efficient, transparent, and incorruptible.
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Appendix
Descriptive Statistics
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Corruption Perception

Obs
1719

Mean
3.40395

Std. Dev.
1.476763

Min
0.4

Max
9.4

Total Rents

2569

10.80973

18.98548

0

214.4921

Coal Rents

850

0.5346659

1.421448

0

22.93144

Forest Rents

2319

1.822632

3.152807

0

47.45462

Mineral Rents

2569

1.010284

3.563341

0

54.16282

Natural Gas Rents

1731

3.152331

12.00562

0

173.2019

Oil Rents

1754

8.832046

16.40206

0

105.95

Fuel Exports

1810

17.91296

29.00962

0

99.73948

Ores and Metals Exports

1897

8.358205

15.2242

0

86.53964

Polity2

2361

1.797543

6.438339

-10

10

Regime Durability

2409

16.60399

18.22518

0
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Polity*Durability

2361

2.911055

205.176

-970

920

Government Consumption

2596

13.04276

9.283947

0.9

67.19

Openness

2696

84.21693

44.84393

1.8

433.05

Ethno linguistic Fractionalization

2850

0.4783032

0.2492972

0

0.9302

Log of Population

2804

15.33619

2.105447

9.125653

21.01901

Log GDPPC Con 2005

2596

8.207052

1.203956

5.080162

11.82269

Central Asia

2960

0.0513514

0.2207507

0

1

Eastern and Southeastern Europe

2960

0.1114865

0.3147868

0

1

Latin America and Caribbean

2960

0.02043919

0.4033247

0

1

Middle East and North Africa

2960

0.1273649

0.3334376

0

1

Sub-Saharan Africa

2960

0.3087838

0.4620698

0

1

Regional Dummy Assignments
Central Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
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Eastern and Southeastern Europe: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova,
Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine

Latin America and the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela

Middle East and North Africa: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo
(Kinshasa), Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Model One
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia,
Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Model Two
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon,
Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Kinshasa), Croatia, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mongolia,
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Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Model Three
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia,
Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Model Four
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia,
Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Model Five
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia,
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Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon,
Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Model Six
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia,
Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United
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Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Model Seven
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Model Eight
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
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Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Research Experience
Monitoring and Evaluation Researcher
May 2013 – Present
The Brookings Institution
Las Vegas, NV
Project: Brookings-Rockefeller Project on State and Metropolitan Innovation
·Research Nevada’s implementation of its new economic development plan.
·Interview stakeholders in the Governor’s Office of Economic Development.
·Interview stakeholders in Nevada’s regional development authorities.
·Identify and examine the networks created to assist in Nevada’s development.
·Attend meetings involving stakeholders.
·Create survey instruments and analyze results.
·Produce reports on a regular basis.
·Participate with conference calls to stay up to date with the project.
·Attend meetings with colleagues to review findings and collaborate on
methodology.
Principal Investigator
Aug 2011 – Aug 2013
UNLV Political Science Department
Las Vegas, NV
Thesis: On the Merits of Resource Curse Theory
This study uses a large-N, cross sectional time series to investigate the
relationship between resource rent abundance and corruption. Data coverage for
the corruption model ranges from 1994 to 2012. The study finds that the
relationship between resource rents and corruption is dependent upon the capital
intensity of the labor and the scarcity of the resources. Fuel related resources have
the strongest correlation with corruption, controlling for other determinants of
corruption identified by the literature.
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Research Experience (continued)
Strategic Plan Graduate Research Assistant
Jul 2012 – May 2013
UNLV Political Science Department
Las Vegas, NV
· Served as the primary research assistant for the UNLV Political Science
Department.
· Conducted in depth research on the entry strategies, labor practices, and business
models of six Chinese firms in Latin America.
· Compiled consumer price index data for Mexican cities from 1970 to present.
· Built a data set for United States military deployments in all countries around the
world.
· Complied data on Mexican auto exports from 2000 to present.
· Complied data on bauxite contribution to GDP in Guyana from 1990 to present.
· Collected data and created charts and graphs for “Immigration and the Contours
of Nevada’s Latino Population.”
Teaching Experience
High School Mathematics Course
Pre-Algebra
Del Sol High School
Jun 2013 – Jul 2013
· Developed lesson plans for a condensed six week summer school course.
· Provided direct instruction and concept modeling to students.
· Increased student comprehension of several mathematical concepts.
· Created testing instruments.
Undergraduate Political Science Course
Introduction to American Politics
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Nov 2012 – Dec 2012
· Lectured in three sections on the philosophical foundations of capitalism, supply
and demand curves, aggregate supply, aggregate demand, financial markets,
goods markets, price setting, wage setting, the deficit, and the financial crisis of
2007.
Undergraduate Political Science Course
The American Presidency
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Aug 2011 – May 2012
· Graded all of the quizzes that were given in the course.
· Proctored all examinations.
· Kept records on the participation grades and quiz grades of the students.
· Held office hours for students that needed additional guidance on the material.
· Covered the course for five weeks while the instructor recovered from surgery.
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Teaching Experience (Continued)
Undergraduate Political Science Course
Natural Resource Policy
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Aug 2011 – May 2012
· Graded all of the weekly assignments and the quizzes that were given in the
course.
· Proctored all examinations.
· Kept records on the weekly assignments and the quizzes.
· Assisted with field trips to Red Rock Canyon, Hoover Dam, and Zion National
Park.
· Held office hours for students that needed additional guidance on the material.
· Covered the course for five weeks while the instructor recovered from surgery.
· Oversaw a field trip to Hoover Dam while the instructor recovered from surgery.
Undergraduate Political Science Course
Survey of Political Theory
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Jan 2012 – May 2012
· Uploaded all texts needed for the class on the e-reserve system.
· Proctored all examinations.
· Held office hours for students that needed additional guidance on the material.
· Compiled data on what political theory courses were being taught at top tier
political science programs in the United States.
Undergraduate Political Science Course
Late Modern Political Theory
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Jan 2012 – May 2012
· Uploaded all texts needed for the class on the e-reserve system.
· Summarized two works by Immanuel Kant for the benefit of students.
· Proctored all examinations.
· Held office hours for students that needed additional guidance on the material.
Undergraduate Political Science Course
Introduction to American Politics
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Apr 2012
· Lectured in two sections on the philosophical foundations of capitalism, supply
and demand curves, aggregate supply, aggregate demand, financial markets,
goods markets, price setting, wage setting, the deficit, and the financial crisis of
2007.
Undergraduate Political Science Course
Early Modern Political Theory
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Aug 2011 – Dec 2011
· Uploaded all texts needed for the class on the e-reserve system.
· Surveyed all recent scholarship on the texts covered in class.
· Proctored all examinations.
· Held office hours for students that needed additional guidance on the material.
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Teaching Experience (Continued)
Undergraduate Political Science Course
Introduction to American Politics
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Nov 2011
· Lectured in two sections on the philosophical foundations of capitalism, supply
and demand curves, aggregate supply, aggregate demand, financial markets,
goods markets, price setting, wage setting, the deficit, and the financial crisis of
2007.
Middle School Social Studies Course
All Subjects
High Performance Junior Academy
Mar 2011 – Jun 2011
· Worked in conjunction with Nevada Virtual Academy to deliver instruction to
students.
· Developed personalized lesson plans for students ranging from Middle School to
High School.
· Graded all tests and assignments.
· Taught lessons in mathematics, writing, reading, history, and geography.
High School Social Studies Course
World History
Clark High School
Jan 2011 – Feb 2011
· Lectured students on world history starting with the industrial revolution.
· Led discussions about philosophical positions on various issues.
· Graded assignments and quizzes.
· Related democratic revolutions of the 19th century to the Arab Spring.
Middle School Social Studies Course
World Geography
Fremont Middle School
Jan 2010 – May 2010
· Lectured students on the geography of Eastern Europe and Asia.
· Reinforced students’ knowledge of latitude and longitude using a March
Madness lesson.
· Assisted with data entry concerning standardized tests.
· Integrated latest technologies to help teach students.
High School Social Studies Course
United States Government
Chaparral High School
Aug 2009 – Dec 2009
· Lectured students on the philosophical roots of the Enlightenment.
· Reinforced students’ knowledge of maps, keys, legends, and charts.
· Provided assistance to bilingual students to help develop writing skills.
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Work Experience
Senior Ambassador
Jan 2007 – Aug 2011
UNLV Career Services Department
Las Vegas, NV
· Maintained the UNLV Careerlink data base.
· Networked with employers in the Las Vegas community.
· Processed payments for the UNLV Career Day and the UNLV Fall Marketplace.
· Compiled end of the year reports for the Student Services Cluster.
· Analyzed data for office traffic, library use, employment rates and wages for
graduating students.
· Provided guidance to students on resume, cover letter, and curriculum vitae
writing.
· Responsible for creating the work schedule and hiring new student workers.
· Conducted regular inventories on office supplies.
· Responsible for ordering all office supplies.
· Maintained the computer lab and processed all work order requests.
Extracurricular Activities
Political Science Department Representative
Aug 2012 – May 2013
Graduate and Professional Student Association
Las Vegas, NV
· Sat in on all meetings of the Graduate and Professional Student Association.
· Member of the Faculty Senate Fiscal Affairs Committee.
· Member of the Graduate and Professional Student Research Forum Committee.
· Member of the Government Relations Committee.
Achievements and Awards
UNLV Access Grant - 2011, 2012, 2013
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Praxis II Principles of Learning Test Achievement Award - 2011
Praxis II Social Studies Content Knowledge Achievement Award - 2011
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Computer Skills
Microsoft Office products, Open Office products, SPSS, STATA

114

